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Creativity plays an important role in our everyday life, and is ubiquitous in our 
consumption environment. Consumers regularly encounter tasks that require creativity, from 
identifying a new way to prepare a meal, deciding on a furniture arrangement for a new house, 
choosing an original birthday gift for a friend, or making up a bedtime story for a child. 
Companies are increasingly engaging consumers’ creativity through crowdsourcing platforms 
(MyStarbucksIdea.com; ideas.lego.com; kickstarter, etc.), customization opportunities (NikeID, 
Casetify customized phone cases, etc.), and products that are designed to assist consumers in 
being creative (e.g., adult coloring books, arts, and crafts). Not only creativity is prevalent in our 
consumption environment, but also is one of the most important forces that drives the 
technological development, scientific progress, and societal advancement. Given the importance 
and ubiquity of creativity, it is important to understand creativity in a systematic and 
comprehensive way, and understand both the antecedents that enhance creativity and its 
downstream implications.  
In the first essay of my dissertation, I explore an important social implication of creative 
engagement –donation behavior. I propose and demonstrate that engaging in creative tasks 
activates an expansive mindset, which within the context of donation behavior, manifests as 
social and moral expansiveness that in turn leads to higher monetary donation. Further, I find 
that such effect of creative engagement on monetary donation holds only when the creative task 
is divergent in nature. When the creative task is convergent in nature, the activation of expansive 
mindset is attenuated, thereby impeding expansion of social and moral circle and hence monetary 
donation. This essay thus demonstrates that not only being creative in itself is desirable, 
engaging in creative tasks can have important positive implications for our society and can lead 
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to positive social behaviors, such as monetary donation.  
Ironically, however, being benevolent may not be the best source for generating creative 
ideas. In the second essay of my dissertation, I examine the effect of malevolent versus 
benevolent intentions on creativity. I argue that having malevolent, as compared to benevolent, 
intentions while engaging in creative tasks induces perceptions of a grandiose sense of self, 
which in turn motivates one to stand out and be different from others in order to maintain such 
self-image, leading to higher creativity. This essay thus proposes that one’s intentions while 
engaging in creative tasks can have significant implications for the quality and originality of the 
ideas generated.  
The findings from the two essays make important contributions to the creativity 
literature. The first essay contributes to the emerging literature that explores the downstream 
implications of creativity, and shows that engaging in creative tasks can have significant positive 
impact on social behaviors, such as donation behavior. In addition, it directly contributes to the 
creativity literature by demonstrating that while both divergent and convergent creative thinking 
can produce creative output, the underlying cognitive processes differ and can have differential 
implications depending on the context under study. The second essay, advances prior research 
that has primarily focuses on examining various aspects of creativity in general or benevolent 
creativity in particular, In this essay, I explore the concept of malevolent creativity (i.e., 
creativity that is intended to hurt others) and find that, ironically, having malevolent intentions 
trump the benevolent intentions within the context of creative generation. Thus, this essay not 
only proposes a novel and important factor that facilitates creative thinking but also directly 
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Traditionally, creativity research has focused on examining antecedents of creativity, 
with much less attention being paid to its downstream implications. Importantly, scarce work 
that does study implications of creativity has simply examined effects of priming creativity and 
has demonstrated negative consequences for social behavior. Extending this nascent line of 
work, the current research argues that under the right context, engaging in a creative thinking 
task may in fact lead to positive social consequences. Results from a set of four main 
experiments and two follow-up experiments demonstrate that engaging in creative thinking tasks 
activates an expansive mindset, which in the context of donation behavior, manifests as moral 
expansiveness and leads to higher monetary donation. Further findings show that the observed 
effect is attenuated when one engages in creative thinking tasks that do not induce an expansive 






Creativity plays a significant role in solving everyday life consumption problems, such as 
planning meals with limited resources (Burroughs and Mick 2004), customizing products to 
satisfy one’s own needs (Dahl and Moreau 2007), and adopting new and innovative products 
(Mehta, Zhu, and Cheema 2012). Given the importance of creativity in consumers’ lives, 
unsurprisingly, a significant amount of research has been devoted to studying various factors and 
cognitive processes that impact creativity, for example, task-related factors like systematic 
training (Goldenberg, Mazursky, and Solomon 1999) and constraints (Moreau and Dahl 2005), 
environmental factors like color (Mehta and Zhu 2009) and noise (Mehta et al. 2012), personal 
factors like life experiences (Maddux and Galinsky 2009) and intrinsic motivation (Amabile 
1996), and cognitive variables such as analogical thinking (Dahl and Moreau 2002) and 
cognitive flexibility (Feist 1998). 
Much less attention, however, has been paid to examining the subsequent implications of 
creativity. The scarce work that does exist in this area has primarily focused on studying the 
effects of priming creativity while demonstrating creativity’s negative influence on social 
behaviors, such as increased dishonesty (Gino and Ariely 2012; Vincent 2013). Despite these 
results and the lay beliefs that creativity can be detrimental in the social context (Arndt et al. 
1999; Feist 1998), I argue that negative behaviors may not be the only consequence of creativity 
within the social domain. Drawing from the research that has argued for positive association 
between creativity and more open-minded and flexible cognitive orientation (McCrae 1987), I 
propose that under the right context, being creative may in fact lead to higher positive social 
behavior.  
Note, as reasoned later, I limit our investigation to examining the effect creative thinking, 
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as is induced through participating in creativity tasks, on positive social behavior of monetary 
donation. In particular, I argue that engaging in a creative thinking task activates an expansive 
mindset, which within the context of donation behavior manifests as moral expansiveness, and 
leads to higher monetary donation. The current work, noteworthily, extends extant literature in 
the nascent area that examines downstream implications of creativity, in two main ways.  
First, while previous work has primarily focused on studying the effect of simply priming 
creativity, I examine the effect of actually engaging in a creative thinking task. In fact, I find that 
engagement in different types of creative thinking tasks (i.e., divergent vs. convergent) may have 
different implications for the resulting donation behavior. In addition to having theoretical 
significance, such inquiry into implications of actual creative engagement also holds real life 
practical importance. In recent years, charitable organizations have started to engage consumers 
through participation in creative thinking tasks before seeking monetary donations. For example, 
the American Red Cross engages its consumers through participation in creativity tasks such as 
drawing and coloring creative designs before seeking donations. However, it remains 
unexamined whether consumers’ participation in such creative thinking activities indeed 
influences their donation behavior and if so why. Hence, my work not only seeks to enhance 
theoretical understanding of downstream implications of creative thinking, as is induced through 
engaging in creativity tasks, but also offers critical understanding of a burgeoning industry 
practice.  
Second, while previous research has primarily focused on negative social behaviors 
resulting from priming creativity, I examine and demonstrate a positive social implication of 
creativity – monetary donation. The current work, hence, contributes to the creativity literature 
by not only examining the downstream consequences of creative behavior that consumers often 
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engage in, but also identifying the context in which such engagement may positively influence 
social behaviors. 
In addition, this research also makes valuable contribution to the donation literature. 
While previous work has explored the role of individual-level characteristics (Winterich, Zhang, 
and Mittal 2012), donor motivations (Lee and Shrum 2012), and employed persuasive strategies 
(Kristofferson, White, and Peloza 2014) on consumers’ willingness to donate, no research, to the 
best of my knowledge, has investigated the role of cognitive processes as induced by external 
factors, such as engaging in creativity tasks, regarding their impact on donation behaviors. My 
work then advances current understanding of how unique cognitive processes that become 
activated by engaging in creative thinking tasks may influence one’s donation behavior.  
In the following sections, I first review the extant literature on creative cognition and 
donation behavior and develop hypotheses regarding whether and why engaging in creative 
thinking tasks may influence donation behavior. I then present six studies that provide support 


















1.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Creative Cognition  
 
Early work equated creativity with “divine intervention”, something perceived as 
exceptional and a mystical gift (Sternberg and Lubart 1999; p.5). However, as research 
progressed, researchers argued for creativity as a product of cognitive processes (Ward, Smith, 
and Finke 1999) that can be produced by ordinary individuals (Guilford 1950). Over time, 
creativity came to be understood as a cognitive process (Hershman and Leib 1988) that leads to 
an output (a work, a product, a solution, or an idea) that is not only different from what is already 
known (i.e., novel and original) but is also effective in solving the problem at hand (i.e., practical 
and useful; Moreau and Dahl 2005; Sternberg and Lubart 1999). It has been argued that such 
creative cognitive process entails retrieval and recombination of knowledge from disparate 
locations in one’s memory (Smith 1995). Essentially, it is a search process that requires 
exploration in a structured conceptual space (Boden 1998). For instance, Perkins (1997) 
discusses creative process as a cognitive search through the “possibility space” of solutions. He 
further clarifies that individuals search through such “solution space” by accessing relevant 
information and knowledge in their mental structure, comprised of a large associative network of 
concepts and ideas. Once the associations are recognized and accessed, individuals must 
combine those associations in novel and original ways to generate creative ideas.  
Creative thinking, I thus argue, entails three main components. First, it involves engaging 
in a diverse and dispersed search through a solution space of concepts and ideas. That is, 
individuals must break away from the constraining effects of existing knowledge (Brown and 
Paulus 2002; Mednick 1962; Guilford 1950) and engage in uninhibited mental exploration while 
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roaming freely across the boundaries between different types of ideas (Goncalo et al. 2015). 
Second, such mental exploration makes one jump easily and quickly from one thought to another 
in a weakly guided fashion (Colzato et al. 2012; Hommel 2012), leading to more spontaneous 
information processing that enables recognition and fluent retrieval of remote associations 
between broad and distant concepts (Dietrich 2004; Guilford 1968, 1982; Runco 1991). Finally, 
these loosely connected ideas and concepts are combined to generate the creative output 
(Ashton-James and Chartrand 2009; Guilford 1959; Isen et al. 1987).  
Such creative process of engagement in diverse and dispersed mental search leading to 
recognition of disparate and broad associations and combination of loosely connected ideas, I 
argue, engenders expansion of one’s mental boundaries so as to include the remotely associated 
novel concepts and ideas that span diverse categories. As an illustration, a good example of a 
creative thinking task is an Alternative Uses Task (Guilford 1967). This task aims to generate 
unusual uses for a common product, such as a brick. The more remote these generated uses are 
from the product’s common use (e.g., using a brick to build a house), the more divergent and 
creative they are in nature (e.g., using it as a chopping block or as an exercise weight; Guilford 
1971; Guilford et al. 1978; Gilhooly et al. 2007; Plucker and Renzulli 1999; Silvia et al. 2008). 
In order to generate such creative output (i.e., uses of a brick) one needs to think beyond pre-
existing knowledge structures and schemas associated with brick usage (e.g., a brick is a 
construction tool) and engage in diverse mental exploration identifying multiple and diverse 
concepts linked to the object. For example, one may start looking at other aspects of a brick, such 
as its physical attribute (e.g., rough) or its material composition (e.g., made of a colored clay). 
Such cognitive processing then leads to retrieval/recognition of associations that are remote and 
diverse in nature (e.g., rough = nail filer; colored clay = chalk), finally combining these loosely 
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connected concepts to reach creative solutions (e.g., use brick as a nail filer; a chalk). Thus, 
ultimately, a creative cognitive process necessitates broadening of mental boundaries, that is, 
adoption of an expansive thinking style.  
To summarize, engaging in creative thinking tasks requires individuals to explore a 
variety of diverse ideas and further recognize and combine associations from remote fields 
(Cropley 2006; Csikszentmihalyi 1997; Guilford 1959). Such cognitive process, I argue, 
activates an expansive processing style, that is, loosens the confinement of previously known and 
salient concepts and ideas (Ward 1994; Abraham et al. 2005) and broadens one’s conceptual 
network (Markman et al. 2007).  
 
Expansive Mindset, Moral Expansiveness, and Donation Behavior 
 
Advancing the above discussion, I suggest that the expansive cognitive orientation, 
induced through creative engagement, persists as an expansive mindset, influencing subsequent 
information processing that in turn has implications for donation behavior. Indeed, research has 
shown that cognitive orientation activated by contextual cues or task engagement in a specific 
context can persist as a generalized mindset, in turn affecting judgment and decision making in 
subsequent and unrelated contexts in which these cognitive procedures are applicable (Brieley 
and Wyer 2002; Chandran and Morwitz 2005; Mehta and Zhu 2016; Xu and Wyer 2007). When 
the subsequent context pertains to donation behavior, which has been shown to induce salience 
of moral concern (Winterich, Vikas and Ross 2009), the extant expansive mindset, I argue, will 
manifest as moral expansiveness, that is, engender expansion of one’s social and moral circle, 
leading to heightened moral concern for a wider range of entities (Crimston et al. 2016, p. 2; 
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Singer 1981).  
Importantly, moral expansiveness not only enhances one’s moral concern for the entities 
considered “close” (e.g., friends), but also towards those who are more “distant” (e.g., a stranger; 
Laham 2009; Reed and Aquino 2003). It incorporates both the breadth and the depth of moral 
concern, that is, represents intensity of one’s moral concern for different entities, and having 
heightened moral expansiveness means granting higher moral concern to all types of entities 
(Crimston et al. 2016). For example, Crimston et al. (2016) presented their participants with 
eight entities: “people from your hometown”, “people from the African continent”, “people with 
an intellectual disability from your country”, “people currently incarcerated in your country”, 
“chimpanzee”, “ants”, “redwood trees”, and “coral reefs”, and asked them to indicate their 
willingness to self-sacrifice to save those entities. It was found that higher moral expansiveness 
(i.e., having expansive moral circle or boundary) was associated with equally higher moral 
concern and willingness to extend care for all eight targets. 
I further propose that the heightened moral expansiveness, which enhances concern for 
others and willingness to extend care, will positively impact donation behavior. It has been 
argued that higher moral expansiveness induces an inclination that all entities merit same 
privileges and rights as oneself or those who are important to oneself (Aquino and Reed 2002: 
Singer 1981), and that people feel obligated to show moral concern and positive social behavior 
towards those entities (Youniss and Yates 1999). In fact, prior research has shown that when 
people have higher moral expansiveness, they tend to act more pro-socially to help others (Reed 
and Aquino 2003; Laham 2009). For example, Crimston et al. (2016) found that moral 
expansiveness led to higher willingness to make financial donations to help various entities. 
Similarly, Bratanova et al. (2012) demonstrated that having more expansive moral circles (i.e., 
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higher moral expansiveness) increases intention to engage in pro-environmental activities.  
 Summarizing the arguments so far, I propose that engaging in creative thinking tasks 
activates an expansive mindset, which in the context of donation behavior manifests as higher 
moral expansiveness and in turn leads to increased monetary donation. Formally, 
 
H1: Engaging in creative as compared to a non-creative thinking task will lead to higher 
monetary donation. 
H2: Engaging in creative as compared to a non-creative thinking task will enhance moral 
expansiveness, which in turn will lead to higher monetary donation. That is, the 
relationship between engaging in a creative thinking task and monetary donation will be 

























1.4 EXPERIMENTS OVERVIEW 
 
 
Six experiments were conducted to test the proposed hypotheses. Experiment 1 and a 
follow-up study examined the effect of engaging in creative thinking task on real monetary 
donation amounts (H1) and as hypothesized found that engaging in creative as compared to a 
non-creative thinking task enhanced the amount of monetary donation. Experiment 2 then tested 
the proposed underlying process and demonstrated that indeed moral expansiveness mediates the 
relationship between creative thinking and monetary donation (H2). Experiment 3 and a follow-
up study examined a critical boundary condition of the proposed effect and showed that the 
positive effect of creative thinking on donation behavior is attenuated when participants engage 
in a creative thinking task that inherently restricts activation of expansive mindset. The final 
experiment further examined the underlying cognitive process by testing the joint effect of 
creative thinking style and expansive mindset on moral expansiveness and its subsequent effect 



















1.5 EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 
Experiment 1 was conducted to test the focal hypothesis (H1) that engaging in a creative 
as compared to a non-creative thinking task, will enhance monetary donation. The donation 
context was adapted from a real-life social enterprise ‘Elephant Parade’. This organization 
invites everyday consumers to create/paint their own elephant toy designs using ‘Artbox Kit’ that 
includes a small white miniature clay elephant and a variety of colors, in return for a monetary 





Eighty-nine undergraduate students (49 women) at a large North American university 
completed this experiment in exchange for a course credit. The experiment was run in small 
batches with no more than 10 participants per session. To begin, participants were checked in 
and assigned to a designated computer desk. Each desk was equipped with a small wooden 
donation box (please see appendix A) along with a white envelope containing $2 in quarters (i.e., 
eight quarters). The donation box was labeled with ‘Elephant Parade’ sticker and had a slit on the 
top. Also, four quarters were left in each donation box, to create an impression that the study 
administrator would not know whether the participant in fact donated money or not, thereby 
reducing the demand effect and participants’ feeling of obligation to donate. Once the 
participants had settled down, the study administrator read them the general instructions for the 
experimental session. The participants were also told that in order to thank them for their 
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participation, in addition to the course credit, they were also being paid $2, which was in the 
envelop on their desks.  
The experiment adopted a one-way design in which participants were assigned to 
complete either a creative (creative condition) or a non-creative task (control condition), which 
were randomized by session, that is, only one of the conditions was run during a study session. A 
drawing task inspired by clay elephant painting as utilized by ‘Elephant Parade’ was used to 
induce the focal manipulation. The participants were told that before beginning the study, we 
would like to put their minds at ease and would therefore like them to engage in a coloring task. 
All participants were given a sheet of paper with a picture of an elephant (please see appendix B) 
and were asked to color it. Those in the creative condition were provided with a box of crayon 
markers with ten different colors and were told to be as creative as possible while coloring and 
decorating the elephant picture. They were also told that they could use any and as many 
different colors as they would like for the task. Those in the control condition, however, were 
provided with ten grey crayon markers and were told to simply color the elephant picture. In 
both the conditions, participants were asked to not spend more than five minutes on the coloring 
task. The coloring task was pretested for manipulation effect and other confounding measures 
(i.e., involvement, perceptions of competence, performance satisfaction, and mood) before it was 
utilized in the main experiment. The pretest confirmed that besides inducing creative thinking 
(i.e., those in the creative condition thought that drawing task required more creativity to 
complete the task), the two tasks were equivalent and the manipulation did not differentially 
influence other potential confounding variables (for detailed procedure and results please see 
appendix C). 
After participants finished the elephant coloring activity, they were presented with the 
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donation task. Specifically, they were told that the experimenters were helping a non-profit 
organization ‘Elephant Parade’ by raising money for it. They were then provided with a short 
description and donation appeal from ‘Elephant Parade’ (please see appendix D for the exact 
instructions). Next, participants were told that if they would like to help out, they could donate 
any amount that they would like, from the money they had received for participating in the 
experiment. To do so they could simply put the quarters they were willing to donate into the 
donation box on their table. The number of quarters each participant donated served as the key 
dependent variable for this experiment. After finishing the donation task, the participants 
provided their demographic information (i.e., age, gender, and nationality) and were then 
debriefed before being dismissed. Note, none of the demographic variables produced significant 




Donation Behavior. The donation behavior was assessed through the amount of money 
that participants donated to the ‘Elephant Parade’ after completing either the creative or the non-
creative drawing task. The amount of donation ranged between zero and two dollars, with a 
mean of $ 0.92. One-way ANOVA conducted for the donation amount revealed that those who 
completed the creative drawing task (M = 1.13, SD = .80), donated significantly higher amount 
of money as compared to those who completed the control drawing task (M = .74, SD = .89; F(1, 





 The results obtained from Experiment 1 provide support for the focal hypothesis (H1) 
that engaging in a creative thinking task enhances monetary donation. Importantly, this 
experiment utilized a manipulation task adapted from a real life creative activity that is used by a 
social enterprise – ‘Elephant Parade’, to raise money for elephant conservation projects. In 
addition, this study also assessed donation behavior through real monetary donations participants 
made to ‘Elephant Parade’. The obtained results thus illustrate real-world implications of the 
current work by demonstrating that indeed participating in creative thinking activities enhances 
monetary donation, and that offering such opportunities to consumers can be an effective way to 
solicit monetary donations.  
One criticism of experiment 1, however, could be that participants colored an elephant 
and were then asked to donate money for a cause related to elephants. Although, such donation 
scenarios are in line with real-life contexts, one may question the generalizability of the effect 
and whether the effect is domain specific or would it hold across contexts (i.e., when the 
donation context is not related to the manipulation task context). To test this assertion, I 
conducted a follow-up experiment with 46 undergraduate students (28 women) from the same 
population as the main study. In this follow-up study, I used a more traditional creativity task to 
manipulate creative thinking and then measured participants’ donation behavior for an unrelated 
non-profit organization.    
 As done in the main experiment, each computer desk was equipped with a small wooden 
donation box with four quarters in it and a “Healthier Tomorrow” (the name of the organization 
soliciting donation) sticker. In addition, an envelope containing eight quarters (i.e., $2) was left 
on each desk, as additional compensation for participating in the study. The manipulation was 
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induced through ‘product uses’ task in which participants are asked to generate uses for a given 
every day object, for example, a brick (Guilford 1967). Following prior research (Friedman and 
Forster 2001; Mehta et al. 2012), in the creative thinking condition, participants were asked to 
come up with as many creative uses of a brick as they could think of. They were also told to 
refrain from listing traditional uses of a brick or uses that are virtually impossible. In the non-
creative thinking condition, the participants were asked to come up with usual or traditional uses 
of a brick.  Next, all participants responded to the same demographic questions as used in the 
main study and were informed that part of the study was now complete. However, before they 
started the second unrelated study, I presented them with a donation request. In particular, they 
were told that experimenters were helping a non-profit organization “Healthier Tomorrow” by 
raising money for it. Then a donation appeal from “Healthier Tomorrow” (a real-life non-profit 
organization that helps people overcome the epidemic of obesity and sedentary lifestyles, 
promoting lifelong habits necessary to promote health) appeared on the screen (Winterich and 
Zhang 2014; see appendix E for the exact instructions). Next, participants were told that if they 
would like to help out, they could donate any amount they preferred, from the money they had 
received for participating in the study, by putting it in the donation box on the table. The 
participants then went on to complete other unrelated studies in the session. 
 Replicating the results from the main experiment, one-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of the task type (F(1, 44) = 4.33, p = .043) on the donation amount. Those 
who completed the creative version of the brick task (M = 1.56, SD = .77) donated significantly 
more money than those who engaged in the non-creative version of the same task (M = 1.05, SD 
= .87). These results then replicate those from Experiment 1 in a context-independent setting, 
thereby providing further support for the focal hypothesis (H1) that engaging in a creative 
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thinking task enhances monetary donation.  
In the next experiment, I seek to advance the current findings by examining the proposed 
underlying process though which creative thinking may impact donation behavior. Also, in 
experiment 1 the role of confounding variables was assessed through a pretest, and no significant 
effect of the two coloring conditions (creative vs. non-creative) was found on involvement and 
one’s perceptions of competence, performance satisfaction and mood. In the next experiment, I 
again test the role of these confounding variables as potential alternative explanations of the 
observed effect, but within the context of the same study. 
 
 
1.6 EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 
Experiment 2 was conducted with an aim to test the role of moral expansiveness as the 
process mechanism that may underlie the effect of creative thinking on donation behavior (H2). 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that engaging in a creative thinking task will activate an 
expansive mindset, which in the context of donation behavior will manifest as heightened moral 
expansiveness, in turn leading to higher monetary donation. The experiment also aimed to rule 
out other confounding measures – involvement, perception of self-competence, performance 




 Ninety-one adults (33 women) who were members of Amazon Mechanical Turk online 
panel completed this experiment in exchange for a small monetary compensation. Participants 
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were randomly assigned to either creative or non-creative thinking task condition. The bubble-
wrap task, borrowed from Mehta and Zhu (2016), was utilized to induce respective 
manipulations. Specifically, all participants were told that the University computer lab was just 
moved to a new location and all shipments came packed in bubble wrap. Now the university had 
almost a room full of bubble wrap sheets and did not really know what to do with it. The 
participants in the creative thinking condition were asked to come up with a creative and novel 
ideas while those in the non-creative thinking condition were asked to come up a traditional and 
usual ideas for what could be done to utilize these bubble wrap sheets. A picture of a bubble 
wrap sheet was also presented to the participants to ensure unilateral perception of the product. 
Once the participants finished the bubble wrap task, they were presented with the same donation 
appeal from Healthier Tomorrow as used in follow-up to experiment 1, and were asked how 
much money would they be willing to donate to Healthier Tomorrow if they had $50 in their 
pocket, at that moment in time. 
Next, to measure moral expansiveness, I utilized the moral expansiveness scale 
developed by Crimston et al. (2016). The participants were first provided with definitions of four 
levels of moral boundaries: 1) an inner circle, 2) an outer circle, 3) fringes of moral concern, and 
4) outside the moral boundary (see appendix F for the details). Next, they were presented with 30 
entities spanning 10 categories (family and friends, in-group, out-group, revered people, 
stigmatized, villains, high-sentience animals, low-sentience animals, plants, and environment) 
and asked to rate how they perceived each entity on the moral boundary using 4-point scales (0 = 
outside of moral boundary, 1 = fringes of moral concern, 2 = outer circle of moral concern, 3 = 
inner circle of moral concern). Note, a higher aggregate score on this task reflects higher moral 
expansiveness (Crimston et al. 2016).  
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 The participants then responded to the manipulation check questions indicating how 
creative they thought was the bubble wrap task, and how much creativity they thought it required 
for successful completion.  Next, they responded to the same confounding measures as used in 
Experiment 1 pretest, on 7-point scales (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). Specifically, they were 
asked to indicate how much effort did they put into the bubble wrap task, how motivated were 
they to do well on the task, and how involved were they when completing the task (involvement 
measure; α = .86). They also answered their level of satisfaction with their performance (i.e., the 
generated solution in response to the bubble wrap problem) and how competent they felt while 
completing the bubble wrap problem. To measure participants’ mood, I asked them to indicate 
how they had felt while completing the bubble wrap task using 7-point scales (1 = not at all; 7 = 
very much) on six items (positive mood (α = .90): happy, cheerful, excited; negative mood (α = 
.95): sad, depressed, upset). Finally, all participants completed the same demographic questions 




Manipulation Check and Confounding Variables. As desired, one-way ANOVA found 
that those in the creative thinking condition reported the bubble wrap task to be significantly 
more creative in nature (M = 4.23, SD = 1.66) as compared to those in the non-creative thinking 
condition (M = 3.19, SD = 1.88; F (1, 89) = 7.72, p = .007) and that it required more creativity to 
complete (Mcreative = 4.73, SD = 1.58; Mnon-creative = 3.26, SD = 1.81; F (1, 89) = 17.01, p < .001). 
Also, replicating the findings from experiment 1 pretest, no difference was observed between the 
two task conditions with respect to participants’ level of involvement (Mcreative = 5.17, SD = 1.37, 
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Mnon-creative = 5.03, SD = 1.49; F < 1), perception of self-competence (Mcreative = 4.98, SD = 1.36, 
Mnon-creative = 4.81, SD = 1.72; F < 1) and satisfaction with their performance on the bubble wrap 
task (Mcreative = 4.57, SD = 1.70, Mnon-creative = 4.91, SD = 1.92; F < 1). Finally, no difference was 
observed on participants’ positive (Mcreative = 3.77, SD = 1.80, Mnon-creative = 3.84, SD = 1.89; F < 
1) or negative mood (Mcreative = 1.71, SD = 1.33, Mnon-creative = 1.39, SD = .93; F (1, 89) = 1.81, p 
= .182) between the two conditions.  
 
Donation Behavior. Replicating the results from previous experiments, one-way ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of the task type on the donation amount (F (1, 89) = 4.66, p = 
.034), such that those who completed the creative thinking task (M = 8.43, SD = 12.18) indicated 
significantly higher amount of money that they were willing to donate as compared to those who 
completed the non-creative thinking task (M = 4.09, SD = 6.29).  
 
Moral Expansiveness. Following Crimston et al. (2016), each participant’s moral 
expansiveness score was calculated based on the aggregate score of all 30 entities (α = .93). 
Note, the score could vary from 0 to 90, with higher scores indicating greater moral 
expansiveness. As hypothesized, it was found that engaging in the creative (M = 53.07, SD = 
13.72) as compared to the non-creative thinking task (M = 46.19, SD = 17.61) did indeed lead to 
higher moral expansiveness (F (1, 89) = 4.28, p = .042).  
 
Mediation Analysis. Finally, I conducted mediation analysis to examine whether, as 
hypothesized, moral expansiveness indeed drives the effect of creative thinking on donation 
behavior. To do so, the bootstrap approach was adopted, where task type was kept as the 
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independent variable, moral expansiveness score as the mediator, and the donation amount as the 
dependent variable in the model (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007). A bias corrected bootstrap 
confidence interval obtained by resampling the data 10,000 times did not include zero, thereby 
indicating a significant indirect (i.e., mediation) effect of moral expansiveness on the relationship 
between creative engagement and the donation amount (β = .95, SE  = .82, bias-corrected 95% 




 The obtained results corroborate the findings from the previous two experiments by 
demonstrating that engaging in creative thinking enhances donation behavior. More importantly, 
the results from this experiment provided evidence for the role of moral expansiveness as being 
the underlying mechanism through which creative thinking impacts donation behavior. This 
study, also ruled out other potential alternative explanations of the observed effect. No difference 
was observed between the two conditions on participants’ involvement, perception of 
competence, their level of satisfaction with the achieved performance and mood. Although, 
intuitively, one may expect positive influence of engaging in creative task on mood I did not 
observe such effect either for the drawing task (experiment 1) or for the unusual uses task 
(experiment 2). I further discuss these finding and my conjectures in the general discussion 
section of the paper. 
So far, I have argued that engaging in a creative task activates an expansive mindset that 
then persists and leads to higher moral expansiveness, in turn enhancing one’s donation 
behavior. If indeed this conceptualization is correct, then the proposed effect should be 
 21 
attenuated when the creative thinking task people engage in does not activate an expansive 
mindset.  
In fact, research suggests that in addition to divergent creative thinking, which forms the 
bedrock of creativity and has been the basis of our discussion so far in the paper, creative output 
may also be achieved through a convergent thinking process (Cropley 2006; Guilford 1959; 
Runco 2003). Convergent creative thinking is usually employed when the task requires an 
individual to generate novel but one right or the best answer that meets a well-defined criterion 
to solve the problem at hand (Colzato et al. 2012; Sowden et al. 2015). Thus, engaging in 
convergent creative thinking not only requires individuals to recognize the remote associations 
among different ideas, as is required during divergent creative thinking, but also needs one to 
maintain the goal of generating the solution that satisfies a well-defined criterion (Cropley 2006; 
Lin and Lien 2013; Runco 2003). Such mental process causes one to focus on only the 
associations within adjacent, rather than diverse, fields that are in line with the desired solution 
criteria, thereby leading to more constrained information processing within a narrower mental 
search space (Cropley 2006; March 1991). Thus, convergent creative thinking restraints the 
freedom to explore and diverge in different directions, which are essential requirements for the 
activation of expansive mindset.  
An example of a widely used convergent creative thinking task is Duncker’s Candle Task 
(Duncker 1945). In this task, participants are presented with a candle, a pack of matches, and a 
box of tacks. Participants’ task is to figure out how to attach the candle to the wall by using only 
the given objects, such that the candle burns properly but does not drip wax onto the floor. The 
creative solution consists of emptying the box of tacks, tacking it to the wall, and placing the 
candle inside it, that is, using the empty box of tacks as a candleholder. Note, the creativity in 
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finding the right solution to this problem requires one to think about using the box of tacks in a 
novel fashion as a candle holder (Duncker 1945; Glucksberg and Weisberg 1966). Thus, in order 
to successfully solve this problem, one needs to focus only on the relevant solutions that are 
likely to satisfy the well-defined criteria set by this task – the candle should be attached to the 
wall and wax should not drip onto the floor. Such restrictive (i.e., singular target and exclusive 
decision-making) mode of information processing forms the basis of convergent thinking 
(Hommel et al. 2011).  
I argue that this style of information processing, which, although creative but convergent 
in nature, will restrict an expansive mindset and hence moral expansiveness, thereby attenuating 
the positive effect of creative thinking on donation behavior. I test this proposition in the next 
experiment.  
 
1.7 EXPERIMENT 3 
 
 
Experiment 3 aimed to examine a critical boundary condition for the effect as observed in 
previous studies. In particular, it tested my proposition that when the engaging in a creative 
thinking task does not activate an expansive mindset (i.e., when creative thinking is convergent 
in nature), the observed positive effect of creative thinking on donation behavior will be 
attenuated. Also, when the task is non-creative in nature (i.e., does not require recognition and 
exploration of remote associations) it should not activate an expansive mindset and hence not 





One hundred ninety adults (85 women), who were members of the Amazon Mechanical 
Turk online panel completed this experiment in exchange for a small monetary compensation. 
The experiment adopted a 2 (Task type: creative vs. non-creative) by 2 (Thinking style: 
divergent vs. convergent) between-subjects design and the participants were randomly assigned 
to one of the four treatment conditions. For the divergent thinking conditions, I utilized the same 
manipulation task as used in the follow-up to Study 1. Specifically, participants completed the 
product use task and were asked to come up with either as many creative and original ideas 
(creative condition) or as many traditional and usual ideas (non-creative condition) for the uses 
of a brick. In the convergent thinking conditions, the participants were presented with Duncker’s 
candle problem (Duncker 1945). In the creative condition, participants were given the regular 
Duncker candle problem task details and instructions. Specifically, the participants were shown a 
picture containing a candle, a pack of matches, and a box of tacks, all of which were next to a 
wall. Participants’ task was to figure out how to attach the candle to the wall by using only the 
objects on the table, so that the candle burns properly and does not drip wax on the table or the 
floor. Under the convergent non-creative condition, the participants were presented with the task 
instructions and setup that has previously been used as the non-creative version of the Duncker’s 
candle problem (Adamson 1952). Specifically, participants were shown a similar problem 
picture as in the creative condition with the exception that the presented box was empty and the 
thumbtacks were shown separately on the table. Thus, in this task, the creative element of 
construing the use of thumbtack box in a novel fashion was missing, rendering this problem-
solving task more traditional and non-creative in nature (Adamson 1952). 
After completing the focal manipulation task, all participants were presented with a 
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donation task. In particular, they were shown an advertisement appeal from a non-profit 
organization – the Pediatric Cancer Foundation, seeking monetary donation to fight childhood 
cancer (see appendix G for the exact instructions), and were asked to indicate the amount of 
money they would be willing to donate to the Pediatric Cancer Foundation if they had $50 in 




Donation Behavior. A two-way ANOVA conducted for the amount of money participants 
were willing to donate returned a significant interaction between task type and thinking style (F 
(1, 186) = 5.90, p = .016; see figure 1). Replicating the results from previous experiments, when 
the task was divergent in nature, the participants who engaged in the creative version (M = 15.24, 
SD = 11.83) indicated higher donation amount as compared to those who engaged in the non-
creative version of the task (M = 10.17, SD = 11.16; t(186) = 2.28, p = .024). Importantly, as 
hypothesized, no difference emerged on the donation amount between the creative and non-
creative conditions when the task was convergent in nature (Mcreative = 10.08, SD = 10.08; Mnon-
creative = 12.57, SD = 9.66; t(186) = 1.14, p = .26).  Further contrast analysis showed that under 
the creative condition, those who engaged in a divergent thinking task (M = 15.24, SD = 11.83) 
indicated a significantly higher donation amount as compared to those who engaged in the 
convergent thinking task (M = 10.08, SD = 10.07; t(186) = 2.36, p = .02). Under the non-creative 
condition, however, there was no difference in the indicated donation amounts between divergent 
(M = 10.17, SD = 11.16) and convergent thinking task conditions (M = 12.57, SD = 9.66; t(186) 
= 1.09, p = .28).  
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Figure 1: Joint Effect of Task Type (Creative vs. Non-creative) and Thinking Style (Divergent 





In addition to replicating the findings from previous studies, experiment 3 results 
highlight the importance of type of creative thinking for its positive effect on monetary donation, 
thereby offering further evidence for the role of expansive mindset in the relationship between 
creative thinking and monetary donation. It was found that only when the creative thinking was 
divergent in nature, and hence could activate expansive mindset, it led to higher monetary 
donation. No effect of convergent creative thinking, which does not activate an expansive 
mindset, was observed on amount of monetary donation. Also, as expected neither divergent nor 
convergent non-creative thinking resulted in higher monetary donation. This, thus, shows that it 
is not only simple divergent thinking per se that affects donation behavior but it needs to involve 
creative thinking that encourages people to explore diverse but also remotely related ideas and 
concepts. In addition, this study provides initial indication of the cognitive processes at play 
under convergent creative thinking. It was observed, even when the convergent thinking was 
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creative in nature it did not positively affect monetary donation, thereby indicating support for 
my argument that engaging in a convergent creative thinking task may encourage a more 
constrained and focused cognitive processing, that in turn impedes activation of an expansive 
mindset.  
Note, in this experiment I used a traditional divergent creative thinking task (brick task; 
Guilford 1967) and a traditional convergent creative thinking task (candle task; Duncker 1945) to 
induce focal manipulations. One may argue that these two tasks are inherently different in nature 
and that the differences beyond simple divergent and convergent thinking requirements may be 
driving the observed effect. Thus, in order to rule out such possibility, I conducted a second 
follow-up study where I sought to induce divergent and convergent creative thinking through the 
same task. Note, as I have argued previously, divergent creative thinking activates an expansive 
mindset because it encourages one to freely explore diverse and remotely associated ideas and 
concepts, whereas the cognitive process is much more constrained during a convergent creative 
thinking as it requires one to think in line with a well-defined criterion that is predetermined for 
the problem solution. Thus, if a predetermined well-defined criterion is introduced for a 
divergent creative thinking task, it will induce a cognitive process that is more convergent in 
nature thereby impeding the activation of expansive mindset and hence leading to lower 
monetary donation.  
One hundred and fifty-four adults (94 women) members of the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
online panel completed this follow-up study in exchange for a small monetary compensation. All 
participants were presented with a ‘Fuel Conservation Problem’ task to induce focal 
manipulation. Specifically, they were asked to imagine the following scenario: “Just suppose that 
you live about 30 miles from your work and that you drive to your work every day. Your car gets 
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about 20 MPG. Now, imagine that you want to use less fuel in your commute for conservation 
reasons. Money is no object.” Then those in the divergent creative thinking condition were asked 
to think and write about - “What options do you think you have to reduce your fuel 
consumption? Please come up with creative solutions to solve this problem.” Those in the 
convergent creative thinking condition, on the other hand, were asked to think and write about, 
“What could be the replacement vehicles for your car? Please come up with creative solutions to 
solve this problem.” Note, the introduction of a well-defined criteria ‘replacement vehicle’ 
constrains explorative process and requires participants to converge on a solution that is within 
the category of a ‘vehicle’. To measure participants’ donation behavior, I used the same donation 
task as utilized in experiment 2 (Healthier Tomorrow donation task). Replicating the results from 
the main study, I found that those who completed the divergent creative thinking task (M = 9.09, 
SD = 12.97) indicated higher donation amounts as compared to those who completed the 
convergent creative thinking task (M = 5.40, SD = 5.59; F (1, 152) = 5.33, p = .022). This 
follow-up study thus provides additional evidence that engaging in a convergent creative 
thinking task, which inhibits the activation of expansive mindset, attenuates the positive effect of 
creative (divergent) thinking on monetary donation. Importantly, this study replicated the results 
from the main study while using the same task to induce divergent versus convergent creative 
thinking.  
In the next experiment, I directly examine the role of expansive mindset and provide 
evidence for its relationship with moral expansiveness – the proposed underlying process, 
through which divergent creative thinking impacts monetary donation.  
 
 
1.8 EXPERIMENT 4 
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In this final experiment, I further explicated the role of expansive mindset and moral 
expansiveness in creative thinking – monetary donation relationship. Note, I have argued that 
creative (divergent) thinking activates an expansive mindset, which then also expands one’s 
moral boundaries and leads to higher monetary donation. However, as demonstrated in 
Experiment 3 this effect is attenuated when creative thinking does not activate an expansive 
mindset (i.e., when it is convergent in nature). If expansive mindset is indeed what drives the 
observed effect then even convergent creative thinking should lead to higher monetary donation 
when expansive mindset is externally induced, as it should persist and lead to higher moral 
expansiveness. On the other hand, when expansive mindset is not externally activated, I should 
replicate the effect as observed in the previous experiments, that is, engaging in divergent 
creative thinking should lead to higher moral expansiveness thereby leading to higher monetary 




Two hundred and seventy-five adults (153 women) from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
online panel completed this experiment in exchange for a small monetary compensation. The 
experiment utilized a 2 (Creative thinking style: divergent vs. convergent) by 2 (Mindset: 
expansive vs. control) between-subject design and the participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the four treatment conditions. To start, participants were presented with either the creative 
version of the brick task or the creative version of the candle task, as used in Study 3, to induce 
divergent versus convergent creative thinking style respectively.  
Next, to manipulate expansive mindset participants were presented with an analogy task. 
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The participants were first provided with the definition of analogy in the context of word-pair 
exercise (the left word pair is analogous to the right word pair) and then presented with ten 4-
word sets that constitute analogies (e.g., ‘baker: cake :: scientist : discovery’; see appendix H for 
all the sets used in the study; Green et al. 2010). They were then asked to examine each pair of 
words and indicate how good they thought each of the presented analogy was on 1 to 7 scales 
(1= not a good analogy, 7 = very good analogy). Those in the control condition completed a 
word reading task instead. These participants were presented with the same words as used in the 
goodness of analogies task, but in a random order such that no connection whatsoever seemed to 
be present among these words. Participants saw these words in a form of a list and were asked to 
read them for about two minutes, approximately the same amount of time as was required to 
complete the goodness of analogies task in the expansive mindset condition.  
After completing the manipulation tasks, participants were presented with the same 
donation task as used in Study 2. Specifically, they were presented with the donation appeal from 
Healthier Tomorrow and were asked if they had $50 in their pocket, how much of it would they 
be willing to donate to this organization, at that moment in time. Next, I assessed participants’ 
moral expansiveness through the same moral expansiveness scale (Crimston et al. 2016) as was 
used in study 2. Finally, all participants answered a few demographic questions as used in 




 Monetary Donation. A two-way ANOVA conducted for the amount of money 
participants were willing to donate returned a significant interaction between type of creative 
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thinking and mindset (F (1, 271) = 5.05, p = .025; see figure 2). Under the control condition (i.e., 
when expansive mindset was not externally induced) those who engaged in the divergent 
creative thinking task (M = 9.64, SD = 11.93) indicated a significantly higher donation amount as 
compared to those who engaged in the convergent creative thinking task (M = 5.57, SD = 5.49; 
t(271) = 2.38, p = .018). However, as hypothesized, when expansive mindset was externally 
induced, no difference was observed in the amount of monetary donation between divergent (M 
= 7.68, SD = 10.58) and convergent creative thinking conditions (M = 8.94, SD = 10.16; t < 1). 
Further contrast analysis showed that the participants who completed the convergent creative 
thinking task, indicated higher donation amounts when expansive mindset was externally 
induced (M = 8.94, SD = 10.16) versus when it was not (M = 5.57, SD = 5.49; t(271) = 2.02, p = 
.044). However, no such difference was observed for the participants who completed the 
divergent creative thinking task (Mexpansive = 7.68, SD = 10.58; Mcontrol = 9.64, SD = 11.93; t(271) 
= 1.16, p = .25). 
Figure 2: Joint Effect of Creative Thinking Style (Divergent vs. Convergent) and Mindset 




Moral expansiveness. To assess participants’ moral expansiveness, I first averaged 
participants’ ratings of their perception of each type of person being within the boundary of the 
given superordinate category to create moral expansiveness index (α = .93). A two-way ANOVA 
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conducted for this index returned a significant interaction between type of creative thinking and 
mindset (F (1, 271) = 4.55, p = .034; see figure 3). The contrast analysis revealed that under the 
control condition (i.e., when expansive mindset was not externally induced), those who engaged 
in the divergent creative thinking task (M = 47.75, SD = 15.13) indicated higher moral 
expansiveness as compared to those who engaged in the convergent creative thinking task (M = 
42.76, SD = 13.22; t(271) = 2.13, p = .034). Under the expansive mindset condition, however, no 
significant difference was observed in moral expansiveness between divergent (M = 45.96, SD = 
12.17) and convergent creative task conditions (M = 47.89, SD = 13.22; t < 1). Further analysis 
showed that the participants in the convergent creative thinking condition, indicated higher moral 
expansiveness when the expansive mindset was externally induced (M = 47.89, SD = 13.22) as 
compared to when it was not (i.e., in the control condition; M = 42.76, SD = 13.22; t(271) = 2.25, 
p = .025). However, no such difference was observed under divergent creative thinking 
conditions (Mexpansive = 45.96, SD = 12.17; Mcontrol = 47.75, SD = 15.13; t < 1). 
Figure 3: Joint Effect of Creative Thinking Style (Divergent vs. Convergent) and Mindset 




 Mediation analysis. Finally, I conducted a moderated mediation analysis to examine 
whether indeed expansive mindset manifests as a moral expansiveness to drive the effect of 
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creative thinking style on donation behavior. A 10,000 resample bootstrap analysis with creative 
thinking style as the independent variable, expansive mindset as the moderator, moral 
expansiveness as the mediator, and the donation amount as the dependent variable in the model 
(see figure 4; Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007), returned an overall significant conditional 
indirect effect (β = - 67, SE  = .47, bias-corrected 95% CI = [-2.00, -.05]). As hypothesized, and 
in line with results observed in Study 2, a significant conditional indirect effect emerged under 
the control condition (β =.48, SE  = .35, bias-corrected 95% CI = [.02, 1.46]), demonstrating that 
when expansive mindset was not externally activated, engaging in a divergent (vs. convergent) 
creative thinking lead to higher moral expansiveness, which in turn increased the donation 
amount. However, when the expansive mindset was externally activated, greater moral 
expansiveness and heightened donation behavior was observed irrespective of creative thinking 
style, and thus no mediation was observed under this condition (β = -.19, SE  = .25, bias-
corrected 95% CI = [-.90, .15]). Importantly, providing support for my conceptualization, a 
significant conditional indirect effect emerged under the convergent creative thinking condition 
(β = .50, SE  = .33, bias-corrected 95% CI = [.05, 1.44]), demonstrating that when expansive 
mindset was externally induced it lead to greater moral expansiveness which in turn leads to 
higher monetary donation. However, as expected no such effect was observed under the 
divergent creative thinking condition (β = -.17, SE  = .27, bias-corrected 95% CI = [-.97, .20]). 
 
Figure 4:  Moderated Mediation Model: Moderating effect of expansive mindset on ‘creative 





The results from this experiment provide further support for my conceptualization that, 
within the context of donation behavior, expansive mindset manifests as moral expansiveness, 
which then drives the effect of creative thinking on donation behavior. Also, the obtained results 
provide further support for my proposition, as observed in Experiment 3, that the positive effect 
of creative thinking on donation is attenuated when such thinking is convergent in nature and 
there is no external activation of expansive mindset. Interestingly, however, when expansive 
mindset is externally induced, it leads to heightened moral expansiveness and thus monetary 



























1.9 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
The present research examined the effect of engaging in creative thinking tasks on 
donation behavior. Four main and two follow-up experiments demonstrated that engaging in a 
creative thinking task activates an expansive mindset, which within the donation context 
manifests as moral expansiveness and in turn leads to higher monetary donation. Further 
explication of the role of ‘type of creative thinking’ in this relationship showed that the positive 
effect of creative thinking on monetary donation only holds when participants engage in 
divergent creative thinking. However, when they engage in a convergent creative thinking task, 
which restricts expansive mindset, the observed effect is attenuated. In particular, Experiment 1 
adapted the donation context from a real-life social enterprise ‘Elephant Parade’, and found that 
engaging in a creative (vs. a non-creative) elephant coloring task increased the actual donation 
amount to this organization. The follow-up study further clarified that the observed effect 
persists even when the creative thinking context and the donation context are independent. 
Experiment 2 provided evidence for the proposed underlying process and showed that moral 
expansiveness drives the relationship between creative thinking and donation behavior. 
Experiment 3 and a follow-up study, presented a critical boundary condition of the observed 
effect by demonstrating that the positive effect on donation behavior is attenuated when one 
engages in a creative thinking task that does not activate an expansive mindset (i.e., a convergent 
creative thinking task). Lastly, Experiment 4, using a moderated mediation model, further 
delineated the role of expansive mindset and moral expansiveness. When expansive mindset was 
externally induced, even convergent creative thinking led to higher monetary donation as it (the 
externally induced expansive mindset) persisted and led to higher moral expansiveness. 
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However, when expansive mindset was not externally activated, engaging in divergent (vs. 
convergent) creative thinking led to higher moral expansiveness resulting in higher monetary 
donation. 
The current research offers several important theoretical and practical contributions. First, 
it advances the creativity literature by examining consequences of engaging in creative thinking 
tasks. While consumers are increasingly being provided opportunities to engage in creative 
activities, from participating in crowdsourcing platforms (MyStarbucksIdea.com; 
ideas.lego.com, etc.) to engaging in customization processes (NikeID, Casetify customized 
phone cases, etc.), very little existing research has examined cognitive and behavioral 
implications of such engagement. The current work, thus, fills this gap in the existing literature 
and offers a comprehensive understanding of how engaging in creative thinking tasks may 
influence positive social behaviors such as monetary donation.  
Note, nascent research in this area has primarily examined and demonstrated negative 
social implications of priming creativity (Gino and Ariely 2012; Vincent 2013). I, on the other 
hand, demonstrate that thinking creatively can also have positive social implications like 
enhanced donation behavior. This results, thus, may seem to be in contrast to the findings 
reported in the previous literature. However, as detailed in my conceptualization, I argue that 
creative thinking (as induced through engaging in a creative task) or a creative mindset (as 
induced through a creative priming) both induce an expansive mindset. However, the context in 
which this expansive mindset persists affects the socio-behavioral outcome. For example, within 
a negative social context that encourages one to be dishonest (Gino and Ariely 2012), the extant 
expansive mindset, I suggest, enhances one’s ability to justify their behavior, which, in turn will 
lead to higher unethical behavior (e.g., dishonesty). On the other hand, if the context makes a 
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positive social participation salient (e.g., donation context makes moral concern salient), the 
induced expansive mindset will enhance one’s related ability in that context (e.g., enhanced 
moral expansiveness and hence higher moral concern) thereby leading to higher positive social 
behavior (e.g., higher donation).  
Importantly, this research also extends this line of research by showing that examination 
of the effects of actual participation in the creative thinking tasks versus simple creativity 
priming provides more comprehensive and thorough understanding of how creativity may impact 
subsequent behavior. For example, a creative mindset as induced through priming may only 
relate to divergent thinking. In line with this research, I too demonstrate that engaging in 
divergent creative thinking activates an expansive mindset that manifests as moral expansiveness 
that leads to higher donation behavior. However, I further extend current understanding of the 
creative thinking implications by engaging participants in convergent creative thinking, which 
involves a more focused cognitive processing that inhibits activation of expansive mindset, and 
thereby attenuates moral expansiveness and subsequent donation behavior. Thus, although both 
divergent and convergent thinking can lead to creative output, the cognitive processes employed 
under these two types of creative thinking styles are different and can thus promote different 
social and behavioral consequences. This then raises the question, whether engagement in 
convergent creative thinking task within the context of negative social behaviors may also 
attenuate the resulting negative social behavior, such as dishonesty? It will be of value for future 
research to further examine this line of thought. 
Another question that may be raised with respect to the obtained results pertains to the 
observed mood effect. One may intuitively think that engaging in a creative thinking task may 
lead to more positive mood, however, no effect of creative thinking emerged on participants’ 
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mood in my studies. Theoretically, the relationship between creative thinking and mood does not 
appear to be a straight forward one. While prior research (Dahl and Moreau 2007) has shown 
that engaging in a creative task can enhance one’s enjoyment, it happened only when the 
participants either were given clear instructions for completing the task or were provided with 
the target outcome. Hence, it appears that more qualifying criteria may be required for creative 
engagement to affect one’s mood. Interestingly, another set of literature has shown that creativity 
is associated with feelings of uncertainty (Mueller, Melwani, and Goncalo 2012). Thus, one may 
argue that such feeling of uncertainty may in fact negatively impact positive mood. It, thus, 
appears that present state of research will benefit from further inquiry and systematic 
examination of how engaging in a creative thinking task may affect mood. Also, while a large 
amount of work has examined the effect of mood on creativity (Baas, De Dreu, and Nijstad 
2008; Kaufman 2003; Davis 2009), little research has explored how creative thinking may affect 
mood. Noteworthily, in the current research, I observed the positive effect of engaging in 
creative thinking tasks on donation behavior even when there was no difference on mood, and 
thus suggesting that the observed results may not be driven by changes in mood. 
Further, I demonstrate that expansive mindset drives the effect of creative engagement on 
donation behavior, but one may question the role construal level may play in this relationship: 
specifically, whether divergent versus convergent creative thinking can also differentially affect 
construal level, which in turn has been shown to influence pro-social behavior (Angerstron and 
Bjorklund 2009; Choi, Park, and Oh 2012). Although deeper research is needed to address this 
issue, I ran a preliminary test of this hypothesis. In particular, I manipulated creative thinking 
style (divergent versus convergent), and asked the participants to estimate temporal distance to a 
dentist visit (Liberman and Forster 2009). Note, temporal distance has been shown to be a robust 
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measure of construal level (Liberman and Forster 2009; Liberman, Sagristano, Trope 2002; 
Trope and Liberman 2010). The obtained findings, however, did not result in significant effect of 
creative thinking style on construal level (F < 1). Hence, these preliminary findings do indicate 
that divergent versus convergent creative thinking may not differentially impact construal level; 
however, a more comprehensive research work would help fully understand the issue. Also, 
although previous research has shown that higher construal level may lead to higher creativity 
(Forster, Friedman, and Liberman 2004; Smith 1995; Smith, Ward, and Schumacher 1993), the 
effect of being creative on construal level is yet to be explored, rendering such an exploration 
worthwhile. 
Finally, the current work offers important practical implications for marketers and 
charitable organizations. This research suggests that charitable organizations can invite 
individual donors to engage in creative behaviors (e.g., the Ice Bucket Challenge, or paint an 
elephant) to enhance their donation behavior. In addition, as mentioned earlier, today’s 
consumption environment offers ever-increasing opportunities for consumers to engage in 
creative behaviors. Hence, it is of value for marketers, policy makers and consumers alike to 
understand how and why engaging in creative activities influences consumers’ subsequent 
cognition and behavior. Thus, this research not only offers theoretical advancement to both 
creativity and donation behavior literatures, but also presents valuable insights to practitioners 











Creativity is generally considered benevolent in nature. It helps individuals cope and 
solve everyday problems, generate new and original findings, and promote societal advancement. 
However, recent research has started to examine dark side of creativity, and argues that people 
can engage in creative tasks with malevolent intentions and use it to inflict harm to others. This 
essay examines the effect of engaging in creative tasks with malevolent versus benevolent 
intentions on creativity of the outcome. It is found that malevolent as compared to benevolent 
intention induces the perception of grandiose sense of self, which motivates one to be different 
from others in order to maintain such aggrandized self-image and hence heightens creativity. 
However, this effect is attenuated when the malevolent intention has unintended benevolent side-














After about six decades of Guilford’s (1950) presidential address where he encouraged 
researchers to focus on discovery and cultivation of creativity, the literature finds itself at 
crossroads with regards to implications of creativity. Traditionally, it had been argued and 
demonstrated that people engage in creative endeavors with positive intentions to generate ideas 
and solutions that ultimately serve a beneficial purpose (Beaussart, Andrews and Kaufman 
2013). Creative engagement not only fuels growth and advancement of individuals and firms, but 
also of the society at large. At a micro level, individuals who think creatively can be more 
effective and efficient in solving everyday problems. Being creative can help people to think 
more flexibly and enables them to better cope with opportunities and changes in everyday lives 
(Runco 2004). At a more macro level, creativity promotes societal advancement, such as 
generating new inventions, original scientific findings, and having flexible adaptations for 
changing environments in the marketplace (Gino and Ariely 2012; Goldenberg and Mazursky 
2002). Thus, typically, research has proposed and found that people engage in creative tasks with 
intentions to generate ideas and solutions that may have positive and beneficial consequences 
(Cropley et al. 2008; Cropley et al. 2014; Cropley 2010).   
Recently, however many researchers have started to argue “dark side” of creativity and 
that it can lead to negative consequences (McLaren 1993). For example, terrorists often use 
creative ways to harm others. September 11, 2001, attacks on America embody ‘creative evil’ 
(Zimbardo 2001). Rather than using creativity for a good cause and societal advancement, 
terrorists came up with a creative way to kill almost 3,000 people, disrupt millions of lives, and 
cost billions of dollars. One may argue terrorist acts as extreme examples of being creative to 
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deliberately harm others. However, it is not unusual to see people in everyday life being creative 
with intentions to harm others, like generating creative social media contents against others – 
both individuals and firms. Case in point – “United Breaks Guitars”, a song that was written by 
Sons of Maxwell against United Airlines customer service. The song has over 16 million views 
on YouTube, and did cause serious harm to the company. United Airlines’ stock price dropped 
10% within four weeks of the release of the video – a decrease of $180 million in company 
valuation (Gulliver 2009). Thus, while creativity can serve beneficial purposes people can be 
creative with a deliberate intention of harming or causing damage to others (McLaren 1993; 
James, Clark and Cropanzano 1999). 
A closer look at these two lines of research raises an interesting question – whether one’s 
intentions (e.g., benevolent or malevolent) to engage in a creative endeavor may affect 
innovativeness of the task outcome, and if so why? Note, as discussed previously, people can 
engage in creative tasks with either positive or negative intentions (Cropley et al. 2014). While 
prior research has traditionally focused on studying and understanding benevolent creativity (i.e., 
creativity that has positive purposes), researchers have only recently started to examine the 
concept of malevolent creativity. The research in this domain is in its infancy and has been 
limited to studying either layperson’s perceptions of malevolent creativity (Cropley et al. 2014), 
or its relationship with personality and situational factors (Harris and Reiter-Palmon 2015; Lee 
and Dow 2011).  
In the second essay of my dissertation, I aim to advance this upcoming line of research by 
examining how one’s intention or purpose of engaging in a creative task (i.e., benevolent vs. 
malevolent) may influence creativity of the outcome produced. Importantly, my work extends 
vast array of research that has focused on examining the relationship between motivation and 
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creativity. While researchers have examined role of type of motivation (approach vs. avoidance; 
Mehta and Zhu 2009), strength of motivation (Nijstad et al. 2010), source of motivation 
(extrinsic vs. intrinsic; Amabile 1993), no work to the best of my knowledge has studied the role 
of motivation valence on creativity. In my dissertation, I directly contrast and compare how and 
why malevolent (vs. benevolent) motivation or intentions may influence one’s creativity. 
Specifically, I suggest that having malevolent, as compared to benevolent intention, will lead to 
higher creativity. I further argue that this happens because malevolent intentions, induce 
perceptions of a grandiose sense of self, which in turn positively impacts creativity.  
In nutshell, the second essay of my dissertation contrasts bright and dark side of 
creativity, and shows that ironically, having malevolent intentions trumps benevolent intentions 
when generating creative ideas. Importantly, these findings may explain why we observe many 
creative and out-of-the-box ideas when people are in fact trying to hurt others, such as in the 












2.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Malevolent Intention and the Grandiose Sense of Self 
Benevolence is one of the most basic human values that concerns preservation and 
welfare of others and goes beyond the selfish interests (Schwartz 1994). Indeed, benevolent acts 
are prevalent in everyday life, where individuals not only behave benevolently towards close 
others (Burnstein, Crandall, and Kitayama 1994; Neyer and Lang 2003), but also towards 
strangers and non-relatives (Griskevicius et al. 2007). On the flip side, humans can also be cruel 
and malevolent (Ryan and Hawley 2016), instigating deliberate harm to hurt others. Note, 
deliberate intention to harm others forms the basis of malevolence, and an accidental or 
unintentional act of harming others may not be considered malevolent (Anderson and Bushman 
2002). Although malevolent behaviors are considered iniquitous by the society and are seen as 
norm violations, such behaviors are easily observable in everyday life. For example, people 
engage in malevolent behaviors to revenge those who may have hurt them or there may even be 
a spontaneous drive to hurt others (Lorenz 2002). Indeed, crime and violence are significant 
problems facing today’s American society (Cole and Dodge 1998; Anderson and Bushman 
2002). The question I ask is, whether such malevolent intentions (i.e., deliberate intentions to 
hurt others), as compared to benevolent intentions (i.e., deliberate intentions to help others), 
impact the creativity of the route adopted or the outcome delivered?  
I argue that, a key difference between benevolent and malevolent intentions is how they 
non-consciously affect perceptions of self-image, which in turn will have implications for 
strategic self-presentation and creativity. Benevolence entails being well meaning in one’s 
intentions and act with an aim to help others (Mohrman, Gibson, and Mohrman 2001). In fact, 
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such benevolent intentions are generally expected by the society and benevolent acts are seen as 
normative behavior that are approved by others (Schwartz 1994). Thus, having benevolent 
intentions during task engagement should induce salience of expected social norms. Indeed, it 
has been argued that people with a benevolent motivations or intentions tend to think in terms of 
collective social and normative goals (Rusbult and Van Lange 2003). It then follows, that having 
benevolent intentions will activate increased concern for social standards and values, thereby 
making people more concerned about how they are presented in front of others and act in ways 
that are compatible with normative goals. 
In contrast, people with malevolent intentions are oriented towards instigating one’s 
influence on others in order to experience “unmitigated agency” (Helgeson and Fritz 1999; 
Paulhus and John 1998; Jones and Paulhus 2011). Indeed, it has been argued that malevolent 
behaviors entail coercive actions that are used to control the behavior of others (Tedeschi and 
Felson 1994) and achieve a generalized sense of self-importance and personal power (Frieze and 
Boneva 2001; Baumeister, Smart, and Boden 1996). Following this line of research, I argue that 
engaging in a task with malevolent intentions will induce a grandiose sense of self, that is, an 
aggrandized feeling of self-importance with agentic self-beliefs (e.g., dominance, uniqueness, 
power; Campbell and Foster 2007; de Bellis et al. 2016; Emmons 1984). It then follows, that 
having malevolent intentions, which activate a grandiose sense of self, will make people focus on 
the inflated sense of self-importance and agentic self-beliefs, thereby making them act in ways 
that focus on self-aggrandization with low regard for normative behavior. Such thought 
processes, I propose, positively impact creativity.  
 
Grandiose Sense of Self and Creativity 
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The grandiose sense of self, as characterized by inflated sense of self-importance and 
agentic self-beliefs, has been argued to induce preoccupation with demanding and receiving 
attention from others (Rose 2002; Wink 1991) in order to maintain perception of aggrandized 
self-image (Calhoun, Glaser, Stefurak, and Bradshaw 2000). One effective way to draw attention 
from others is to stand out and show a distinction between oneself and the larger group 
(Ridgeway 1978; Schachter 1951; Griskevicius et al. 2006). Such attention-getting behaviors that 
set people apart from others and make them more noticeable are typically non-conforming in 
nature (Maslach, Stapp, and Santee 1985). Extending this argument, I propose, that openness to 
engage in such non-conforming behaviors as induced by grandiose sense of self (Imhoff and Erb 
2009) will lead to higher creativity (Galinsky et al. 2008; Forster et al. 2005). That is because, 
when individuals have heightened desire to be non-conformative, they strive to stand out, and 
resist influence or even rebel against the norms (Nail, McDonald, and Levy 2000). Such 
propensity to defy norms has indeed been shown to enhance creativity (Mehta, Dahl, and Zhu. 
2017). For example, Brandt (1976) finds that during word association task, people with high 
motivation to stand out and to be seen different from others generate less common and more 
novel responses thereby displaying higher creativity. Similarly, Dollinger (2003) demonstrates 
that people who have higher need to stand out from others perform better on a variety of 
creativity tasks, such as drawing and story –writing tasks. Kim, Vincent, and Goncalo (2013) 
also find that those who have heightened feeling of being different from others generate more 
creative drawings 
To summarize, I argue that engaging in a task with malevolent intentions induces a 
grandiose sense of self thereby motivating people to think and act differently from others, which 
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in turn heightens creativity of the task outcome. Note, creativity of an outcome is assessed 
through two orthogonal dimensions – originality and effectiveness (Burroughs et al. 2008; 
Goldenberg et al. 1999; Mehta et al. 2012). To be creative, an idea or a solution must not only be 
different from what is already known (i.e., novel and original) but also must be effective in 
solving the problem at hand (i.e., practical and useful, Moreau and Dahl 2005; Sternberg and 
Lubart 1999). However, there is no reason to believe that the grandiose sense of self as induced 
by having malevolent intentions should influence the effectiveness of the ideas. Note, generated 
ideas or solutions are considered effective if they “serve to solve a problem, fit a situation, or 
accomplish some recognizable goal” (MacKinnon 1962, p. 485). People in their everyday lives 
commonly engage in conventional rather than creative performance and focus more on the 
effectiveness than the originality of the ideas/solutions they generate (Eisenberger et al. 1999). 
Hence, while people may be able to generate more original ideas while having malevolent 
intentions, they are still conscious about the effectiveness and practicality of the suggested ideas 
and solutions to the given problem. In fact, previous research has shown that creativity is largely 
driven by the originality dimension (Sellier and Dahl 2011), and while various factors have been 
shown to influence the originality dimension of creativity, they often do not have a similar 
impact on effectiveness (Mehta and Zhu 2016; Moreau and Dahl 2005). Thus, I argue that while 
having a malevolent intention increases one’s ability to generate more original ideas, it does not 
compromise the effectiveness of the generated ideas.  
 
Formally, I hypothesize:  
 
H1: Engaging in a creative task with malevolent as compared to benevolent intentions, will 
lead to higher creativity of the output. 
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H2:  Grandiose sense of self will mediate the relationship between malevolent versus 
benevolent intention and creativity, such that engaging in a creative task with malevolent 
as compared to benevolent intentions, will induce a grandiose sense of self, which in turn 





















2.4 EXPERIMENTS OVERVIEW 
 
I conducted one pilot study and four experiments to test the proposed hypotheses. The 
pilot study sought to provide the initial evidence that when engaging in a creative task with 
malevolent intentions as compared to engaging in a task with benevolent intentions or no specific 
intentions, leads to higher creativity. Experiment 1 further explored the positive effect of 
malevolent intention on creativity using a social media context and ruled out several alternative 
explanations. Experiment 2 compared the effect when the target of malevolent intention was 
either a big company or just an individual and found that the type of target does not influence the 
observed effect. Experiment 3, examining an interesting boundary condition of the effect, found 
that when the intention to hurt others may have an unintended benevolent consequence (i.e., 
engage in a task to hurt others but without malevolent intentions) the effect gets attenuated. 
Experiment 4 adopted a mediation model to demonstrate the underlying role of grandiose sense 











2.5 PILOT STUDY 
 
I first conducted a pilot study to examine if engaging in a creative task with malevolent, 
as compared to benevolent intention, will lead to higher creative output. In addition, I included a 
control condition in this experiment to explore whether it is the malevolent intention that 
increases, or the benevolent intention that reduces, creative output. Note, I have argued that 
having benevolent intentions while engaging in a creative task aligns with the expected social 
norms. Hence, the default for individuals is that they will have, even though implicit, benevolent 
intentions while engaging in a creative task even if they are not specifically told to adopt specific 
intentions (i.e., control condition). Therefore, the output creativity should not be significantly 




One hundred and twenty-four adults (60 women) from the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
online panel completed this pilot study in return for a small monetary compensation. The 
participants were randomly assigned to malevolent intention, benevolent intention, or the control 
condition. The focal task required participants to imagine a scenario and come up with a creative 
way to respond to the situation they found themselves in the presented scenario (please see 
appendix I for the complete scenarios). In the malevolent intention condition, the participants 
were told to imagine that they were a college student who was active on social media. For no 
particular reason, they really disliked one of their classmates, Nancy. They didn’t get along with 
her and wanted to agonize her and therefore decided to use social media to cyberbully Nancy. 
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They were asked to come up with a creative way to do so given that they had malevolent 
intentions to hurt Nancy. In the benevolent intention condition, the participants were told that for 
no particular reason, they really liked Nancy. They get along well with her and they wanted to 
help her because she was being cyberbullied. Again, they were asked to come up with a creative 
way to do so given that they had benevolent intentions to help Nancy. In the control condition, 
participants were simply told that they found out that one of their classmates Nancy is being 
cyberbullied, and their task was to come up with a creative way to respond to this situation. After 




Creativity. In line with previous research, I separately assessed the originality and 
effectiveness (i.e., the two dimensions of creativity; Goldenberg et al. 1999; Moreau and Dahl 
2005) of the generated ideas. First, I invited two independent judges who were trained research 
assistants blind to the hypothesis and conditions and asked them to rate each of the generated 
idea on three items measuring originality (original, novel, and innovative; Moreau and Dahl 
2005) – on 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Next, I averaged each judge’s ratings 
on the three originality items (α = 1.0) to obtain an average originality score for each judge. 
These scores were then averaged to calculate an overall originality score for each participant (r = 
.30, p < .001). A one-way ANOVA conducted for this score returned a significant main effect of 
malevolent intentions on originality of the generated ideas (F(2, 121) = 13.21, p < .001). 
Contrast analysis showed that the ideas generated by the participants in the malevolent intention 
condition (M = 3.85, SD = .84) were judged to be significantly more original than the ideas 
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generated by participants in the benevolent intention condition (M = 3.17, SD = .63, t(121) = 
4.19, p < .001) and those in the control condition (M = 3.08, SD = .73, t(121) = 4.70, p < .001). 
Importantly, there was no difference on the judged originality between the benevolent intention 
condition and the control condition (t < 1).  
Next, to assess effectiveness of the generated ideas, I invited another set of two trained 
research assistants as independent judges to rate each idea on three effectiveness items (useful, 
effective and practical; range: α = .99 to 1.0) on 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
The three items were averaged to calculate an overall effectiveness score for each idea (r = .22, p 
= .01) following the same procedure as was used to calculate the overall originality score. One-
way ANOVA revealed a non-significant main effect of intention type on effectiveness of the 
generated ideas (F(2, 121) = 1.49, p = .23). No contrast between any of the conditions reached 




 In this pilot study, it was found that those in the malevolent intention condition generated 
more original ideas, as compared to those in the benevolent intention condition or those in the 
control condition, when one does not have any intention to help or hurt the target. Importantly, as 
hypothesized, no difference was observed between the benevolent intention condition and the 
control condition on the originality of the generated ideas. Hence, this pilot study provides initial 
support for H1 that having a malevolent intention increases originality. Note, however, in this 
study the participants were specifically asked to imagine that they either liked or disliked the 
target. It is possible that such instructions might have influenced participants level of intrinsic 
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motivation to hurt versus help the target, and importantly, intrinsic motivation has also been 
shown to influence creativity (Koestner et al. 1984). Thus, in the main experiment, I specifically 
measure intrinsic motivation in order to assess the role of motivation strength in intention – 
creativity relationship. In addition, in the main experiment I used a focal task that was set up in a 
more real life marketing context. Further, since no difference was observed between the 
benevolent intention condition and control condition on originality, I dropped the control 
condition in the next and all subsequent experiments, focusing on examining the difference 
between benevolent and malevolent intention conditions. 
 
2.6 EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Experiment 1 was designed to further examine the focal hypothesis that engaging in a 
creative task with malevolent, as compared to benevolent intention, will increase originality of 
the ideas generated (H1). Importantly, the experiment was set up in the context of examining 
word of mouth marketing effort through social media, thereby aiming to test real-world 




Seventy-eight adults (28 women) completed this experiment at a large North American 
university in exchange for a course credit. The participants were randomly assigned to either the 
malevolent or benevolent intention condition. To induce the respective manipulations, 
participants were presented with a scenario in which they were asked to imagine themselves as a 
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creative director at an ad agency who is looking to do an out-of-the-box social media project to 
reaffirm his/her position as one of the best creatives in the field. In the malevolent (benevolent) 
intention condition, they were told that one of their friends had told them about her experience 
with an innovative all natural skincare line that had worked really bad (well) for her. Further, 
participants were told that they did some research and were truly disappointed (impressed) by the 
skincare line and thus they decided to create a negative (positive) word of mouth campaign that 
may hurt (help) this company (for the complete scenarios, please see appendix J). The 
participants’ task was to come up with an idea for a creative social media campaign to generate a 
negative (positive) word of mouth for this company, which would help them show off their skills 
as one of the best creative people in the field.  
After participants finished the idea generation task, I measured whether having the 
malevolent versus benevolent intentions influenced participants’ intrinsic motivation to do well 
on the task. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate how would they feel about creating 
the negative (positive) word of mouth social media campaign. I used three subscales from the 
intrinsic motivation inventory (Ryan 1982): perceived competence (e.g., I think I am pretty 
skilled at this activity), interest/enjoyment (e.g., I see that this activity will be a lot of fun to do), 
and effort (e.g., I think that I will try very hard on this activity; for complete scale items, please 
see appendix K). Finally, they completed demographic information questions and were debriefed 





Intrinsic Motivation. I first created indexes for each of the three subscales –
interest/enjoyment (α = .91), effort (α = .82) and perceived competence (α = .92). One-way 
ANOVAs demonstrated that there was no difference between the malevolent and benevolent 
intention conditions on any of the subscales (interest/enjoyment: Mmalevolent = 4.02, SD = 1.27; 
Mbenevolent = 4.00, SD = 1.37; F < 1; effort: Mmalevolent = 4.10, SD = 1.26; Mbenevolent = 4.03, SD = 
1.27; F < 1; perceived competence: Mmalevolent = 4.32, SD = 1.35; Mbenevolent = 4.14, SD = 1.30; F < 
1). Also, no difference was observed for an overall intrinsic motivation index, comprising all 
three subscales (α = .95), between the two intention conditions (Mmalevolent = 4.14, SD = 1.18; 
Mbenevolent = 4.06, SD = 1.25; F < 1).  
 
Creativity. Next, I examined the effect of malevolent versus benevolent intentions on the 
creativity of the generated ‘word of mouth social media campaign’ ideas. First, I invited ten 
independent judges from the same population as participants and asked them to rate each of the 
generated idea on three items measuring originality (original, novel, and innovative; Moreau and 
Dahl 2005) – on 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Next, I averaged each judge’s 
ratings on the three originality items (range: α = .89 to 1.0) to obtain an average originality score 
for each judge. These scores were then again averaged to calculate an overall originality score 
for each participant (α = .87). A one-way ANOVA conducted for this score returned a significant 
main effect of intentions on originality of the generated ideas (F(1, 76) = 6.47, p = .013), such 
that the ideas generated by the participants in the malevolent intention condition (M = 3.11, SD = 
1.05) were judged to be significantly more original than the ideas generated by participants in the 
benevolent intention condition (M = 2.60, SD = .71).  
Next, to assess effectiveness of the generated ideas, I invited another set of ten 
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independent judges and asked them to rate each idea on three effectiveness items (useful, 
effective and practical; range: α = .80 to .99) on 7-point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Eight judges responded with completed ratings, which were then used to calculate an overall 
effectiveness score for each idea (α = .79) following the same procedure as was used to calculate 
the overall originality score. Interestingly, one-way ANOVA revealed a marginally significant 
main effect of intention type on effectiveness of the generated ideas (F(1, 76) = 3.46, p = .07), 
such that malevolent intention (M = 4.15, SD  = 1.00) led to higher effectiveness of the generated 




In this experiment, within the context of social media marketing campaign, it was found 
that those who had malevolent intentions to generate a word of mouth campaign to hurt others 
came up with more original ideas than those who had a benevolent intention to help others. 
Interestingly, it was also observed that malevolent intentions also lead to marginally more 
effective ideas. In addition, this experiment ruled out the possibility that people may have 
different levels of intrinsic motivations when they have malevolent versus benevolent intentions 
for engaging in creative tasks.  
Note, however, in this experiment, the target that the participants were aiming to hurt 
(help) through their creative endeavor was a large company. One may argue that since 
participants were asked to generate negative (positive) word of mouth campaign ideas to hurt 
(help) a large institution, people may want to “fight the man”. This argument would then suggest 
that the observed effect should only emerge when the target of the intention is a big institution 
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and should attenuate for an average ordinary person. While the pilot study provided initial 
evidence that this should not be the case because the target in the pilot study was an individual 
person, I sought to further rule out this possibility by experimentally manipulating both the 
intentions and the target in order to demonstrate that the observed effect hold irrespective of the 
type of target.  
 
2.7 EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Experiment 2 was conducted to explore whether the effect of malevolent intention on 
creativity is contingent on the type of target (i.e., large institutions versus an average individual) 
that one aims to help versus hurt. Note, my conceptualization suggests that the effect should 
emerge irrespective of the target type because when one has malevolent intentions to hurt others, 
s/he should feel a grandiose sense of self regardless of who the target is. This in turn should 




Eighty-nine adults (41 women) from Amazon Mechanical Turk online panel completed 
this experiment in exchange for a small monetary compensation. The experiment utilized a 2 
(Intention: malevolent vs. benevolent) by 2 (Target: institution vs. average person) between-
subject design and the participants were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment 
conditions. Similar to experiment 1, participants were told that they would be presented with a 
scenario and asked to imagine themselves as the main characters in the scenario (for the 
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complete scenarios, please see appendix L). Specifically, participants were asked to imagine that 
they were visiting a big city in the United States for the first time. To manipulate the target type, 
participants were told that they decided to use a taxi service (vs. an Uber driver) to travel within 
the city. Thus, the target of intention was either the taxi company or an individual (i.e., the Uber 
driver). Further, in the malevolent (benevolent) intention condition, participants were told that 
they had really bad (good) experience while using the service and they decided to use a creative 
way to take a revenge and hurt (support and help) the taxi company (Uber driver). The bad 
(good) experience was described vividly and in detail in the scenario in order to elicit enough 
motivation for participants to hurt (help) the target. Participants were then told that in order to 
hurt (help) the taxi company/Uber driver, they felt that using social media would be the most 
effective way and were asked to be as creative as possible to come up with a creative social 
media campaign in order to hurt (support) the taxi company/Uber driver.  
After the participants finished generating ideas for the creative social media campaign, I 
measured their involvement and effort while completing the social media task. Specifically, 
participants were asked to think back to the time when they were generating their ideas for the 
social media campaign and indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statements, 
including “I would say I was very involved while generating my idea” (involvement) and “I tried 
pretty hard on generating the creative idea” (effort). Finally, a manipulation check was 
conducted to make sure that the scenario did elicit malevolent (benevolent) intention. They were 
asked to indicate how malevolent was their intention while coming up with the social media 
campaign. Lastly, participants completed the same demographic information questions as in 





Manipulation Check. As desired, one-way ANOVA showed that those in the malevolent 
intention condition (M  = 4.61, SD = 1.75) felt that their intention was significantly more 
malevolent than those in the benevolent intention condition while completing the social media 
campaign (M  = 1.85, SD = 1.43; F (1, 87) = 67.09, p < .001).  
 
Involvement and Effort. Two-way ANOVAs revealed that there was no interactions 
between the intention and target on both variables (involvement: Mmal/individual = 5.35, SD = 1.72; 
Mmal/company = 5.17, SD = 1.34; Mbene/individual = 5.74, SD = 1.25; Mben/company = 5.60, SD = 1.38; F < 
1; effort: Mmal/individual = 5.04, SD = 1.52; Mmal/company = 5.50, SD = 1.15; Mbene/individual = 5.52, SD = 
1.20; Mben/company = 5.16, SD = 1.70; F (1, 85) = 1.79, p = .19).  
 
Creativity. As done in experiment 1, I separately assessed the two dimensions of 
creativity – originality and effectiveness (Goldenberg et al. 1999; Moreau and Dahl 2005) and to 
do so invited two sets of independent judges from the same population as the main study to rate 
the generated ideas on the originality (original, novel, and innovative) and the effectiveness 
dimension (useful, effective and practical). Two sets of seven judges returned the completed 
rating for both originality items (range: α = .60 to 1.0) and effectiveness items (range: α = .76 to 
.98), which were then averaged to calculate an overall originality score and an effectiveness 
score (α = .71) for each participant. As hypothesized, the interaction between intention and target 
was found to be non-significant for the originality of the ideas generated (F (1, 85) = 1.49, p = 
.23). Importantly, however, replicating the results from Experiment 1, a main effect of intention 
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type was revealed such that those in the malevolent intention condition (M  = 3.48, SD = .64) 
generated significantly higher original ideas than those in the benevolent intention condition (M  
= 3.17, SD = .76; F (1, 85) = 4.39, p = .039). There was no main effect of target type (F < 1). 
Also, no interaction between target and intentions was observed for the effectiveness of the 
generated ideas (Mmal/individual = 3.30, SD = .91; Mmal/company = 3.58, SD = .94; Mbene/individual = 3.45, 
SD = .87; Mben/company = 3.56, SD = .93; F < 1). In addition, no main effect emerged for either the 




 The results obtained from this experiment provide additional evidence that having 
malevolent intentions increases originality of the generated ideas. In addition, the results show 
that the positive effect of malevolent intentions on creativity is not dependent on the 
characteristics of the target, and the effect holds no matter whether the target is an average 
person (i.e., someone has relatively small power) or a large institution (i.e., someone who has a 
large power), thereby demonstrating generalizability of the effect. Further, this experiment 
further rules out the possibility that having malevolent versus benevolent intentions influences 
other confounding variables, such as the involvement of the task and the effort that one puts into 
the task.  
 Through experiments 1 and 2, it was consistently found that having a malevolent as 
compared to a benevolent intention increases the originality of the generated ideas, and this 
effect is target independent such that the effect emerges irrespective of whether the target is a 
large institution or an average person. However, in all the experiments so far, participants were 
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asked to adopt malevolent intentions to hurt others. But, it is possible in everyday life that 
hurting someone may also help someone else. That is, hurting someone may in fact have 
underlying benevolent intentions or consequences. Thus, an interesting question that arises is 
whether our results will still hold under such conditions. Note, we have argued that it is the 
malevolent intention to hurt others that induces grandiose sense of self which then leads to 
higher creativity. Hence, if even hurting someone has a beneficial cause it should not induce 
grandiose sense of self and therefore should not lead to higher creativity. I examine this 
proposition in the next experiment.  
 
2.8 EXPERIMENT 3 
 
 Experiment 3 was conducted with an aim to examine the effect of malevolent intentions 
on creative output, when such intention may have an unintended but salient benevolent 
consequence. Based on my arguments and conceptualization earlier, I expect that having salient 
benevolent consequences, even though unintended, of a malevolent intention would attenuate the 
grandiose sense of self while making people focus on the normative and collective goals, which 




One hundred and sixty-five undergraduate students (93 women) at a large North 
American university completed this experiment in exchange for a course credit. The experiment, 
adopted a 2 (Intention: malevolent vs. benevolent) by 2 (Unintended Consequence: control vs. 
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benevolent) between-subject design, where participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
four treatment conditions. Similar to previous experiments, participants were asked to imagine 
themselves as the main characters in the scenario in which they had been planning to take a 
family vacation and had decided to work with a vacation planning company. To manipulate the 
intentions, the scenarios differed on how they were treated by the vacation planning company, 
and their reactions to the company on whether to hurt or support the company. Specifically, in 
the malevolent intention condition, their experience with the vacation planning company was 
very bad and they decided to use a creative way to hurt the company. In the benevolent intention 
condition, however, they had a great experience with the vacation planning company and thus 
they decided to use a creative way to help the company (for the details of the scenarios, please 
see appendix M). As done in experiment 2, we asked participants to come up with a creative 
social media campaign in order to hurt (help) the company. To manipulate the consequence, in 
the benevolent consequence condition, participants were further told that they felt that using 
social media would be the most effective way to hurt (help) the company because consumers 
around the globe could see their bad (good) experience while making the decision to work with 
the company or not. Thus, they were asked to come up with a creative social media campaign to 
make people aware of their bad (good) experience in order to hurt (help) the company. However, 
this information was absent in the control condition. Note, making other consumers aware of 
one’s bad (good) experience is an unintended benevolent consequence as it can help other 
consumers make more informed decisions. Next, all participants completed the same 
manipulation check question as in experiment 2, and finished the experiment by answering 
demographic information questions as used in previous experiments. Finally, the participants 




Manipulation Check. One-way ANOVA showed that the intention manipulation was 
successful, such that those in the malevolent intention condition (M  = 4.33, SD = 1.68) felt that 
their intention was more malevolent than those in the benevolent intention condition while 
completing the social media campaign task(M  = 2.30, SD = 1.46; F (1, 163) = 69.02, p < .001).  
 
Creativity. Next, I explored the interactive effect of intention and unintended benevolent 
consequence on the originality of the generated ideas. Again, eight independent judges were 
invited to judge the originality of the social media campaign ideas using the same three scale-
items (original, novel, and innovative; Moreau and Dahl 2005; range: α = .80 to 1.0), and their 
scores were then averaged to calculate an overall originality score for each participant (α = .85). 
Two-way ANOVA revealed that there was a significant interaction between intention and 
unintended benevolent consequences (F (1, 161) = 5.16, p = .02, see figure 1). Contrast analysis 
showed that under the control condition (i.e., when there was no explicit mention of unintended 
benevolent consequence), the results observed in previous experiments were replicated such that 
those with a malevolent intention to hurt the company (M = 3.13, SD = .82) generated ideas that 
were judged to be more original than the ideas that were generated by participants who worked 
with a benevolent intention to help the company (M = 2.78, SD = .59; t(161) = 2.10, p = .037). 
However, when the unintended benevolent consequence was made explicit, the effect was 
attenuated such that no difference was observed between the malevolent (M = 2.68, SD = .82) 
and benevolent intention conditions on idea originality (M = 2.87, SD = .83; t(161) = 1.13, p = 
.26). Further contrast analysis showed that under the malevolent intention conditions, when 
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unintended benevolent consequence was not made explicit (M = 3.13, SD = .82), people 
generated significantly more original ideas than when the unintended benevolent consequence 
was made explicit (M = 2.68, SD = .82; (t(161) = 2.65, p < .01). However, this difference was not 
significant under the benevolent intention conditions (Mbenevolent consequence = 2.87, SD = .83; 
Mcontrol = 2.78, SD = .59; t < 1).  
Next, to assess effectiveness of the generated ideas, ratings from four independent judges 
(range: α = .91 to .96) were used to create an overall effectiveness score for each idea (α = .64). 
There was no interaction between intention and unintended consequence on the effectiveness of 
the ideas (Mmalevolent/benevolent consequence = 2.99, SD = .97; Mmalevolent/control = 3.45, SD = 1.12; 
Mbenevolent/benevolent consequence = 3.20, SD = .83; Mbenevolent/control = 3.67, SD = .77; F < 1). However, 
there was a significant main effect of consequence such that people generated more effective 
ideas under the control condition (M = 3.56, SD = .95) than under the benevolent consequence 
condition (M  = 3.09, SD = .90; F (1, 161) = 10.28, p < .01).  
Figure 5: Interaction Effect of Intention (Malevolent vs. Benevolent) and Unintended 






 The results from this experiment, showed that although having a malevolent versus 
benevolent intention enhanced originality of the generated social media campaign ideas under 
control conditions, when an unintended benevolent consequence of the behavior (e.g., helping 
others make more informed decisions) was made salient, the effect was attenuated. Further, 
interestingly, the results showed that under control condition (i.e., when benevolent consequence 
was not made salient) the generated ideas were judged to be more effective as compared to the 
ideas generated in the condition where benevolent consequence was salient. This may be because 
those in the benevolent consequence conditions not only need to focus on generating the ideas to 
support (hurt) the company but also need to take other consumers into consideration, the two 
goals may not be compatible as the targets of the goals are very different. Thus, the creative 
output that satisfies one goal may not be able to satisfy the other goal, thereby leading to lower 
effectiveness. However, this is an interesting finding that warrants detailed further examination 
that may be undertaken by future research.  
 So far, I have found that having a malevolent intention increases one’s ability to generate 
original ideas, and this effect persists irrespective of the type of target, from average individuals 
to large institutions. Interestingly, it was also found that when the unintended benevolent 
consequences of malevolent intention are made salient, the effect is attenuated. This reduction in 
originality of the ideas may suggest that when benevolence becomes salient, people care more 
about social values and rules, which in turn leads to lower creativity. In the next experiment, I 
examine the proposed underlying process and demonstrate that grandiose sense of self drives the 
effect of malevolent intentions on creativity.  
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2.9 EXPERIMENT 4 
 
Experiment 4 was conducted with an aim to test the role of grandiose sense of self as the 
process mechanism that may underlie the effect of malevolent intention on creativity. 
Specifically, it was hypothesized that having a malevolent versus benevolent intention induces a 




Eighty adults (42 women) from the Amazon Mechanical Turk online panel completed 
this experiment in exchange for small monetary compensation. The experiment adopted a one-
way design and the participants were randomly assigned to either benevolent or the malevolent 
intention condition. The intention manipulation was similar to that used in experiment 1, and was 
inspired by the ‘United Breaks Guitar’ incidence. Specifically, participants were asked to 
imagine that they were creative directors at an ad agency and were looking to do an out-of-the-
box social media project to reaffirm their position as one of the best creative in the field. In the 
malevolent (benevolent) intention condition, they were told that one of their friends had told 
them about her bad (good) experience with an airline company. They did some research and 
were utterly disappointed (truly impressed) by the airline company and thus they decided to 
create a negative (positive) word of mouth campaign that may hurt (help) this company (for the 
complete scenarios, please see appendix N). Their task was to come up with an idea for a 
creative social media campaign to generate a negative (positive) word of mouth for this 
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company, which would help them show off their skills as one of the best creative people in the 
field.  
Once participants finished generating the word of mouth campaign, I measured their level 
of grandiose sense of self (Maslach, Stapp, and Santee 1985). This measure includes several 
behaviors that show the open display of inflated self-importance and agentic self-believes like 
dominance, uniqueness, and power. Specifically, participants were told that in this task, we 
would like to understand how their participation in the creative task might have influenced their 
willingness to engage in several behaviors. Then they were asked to think back to the creativity 
task and tell us how after completing the task, they would have been willing to : 1) “give a 
lecture to a large audience”, “publically challenge a speaker whose position clashes with your 
own”, and “speak up about your ideas even though you may be uncertain about whether you are 
correct.” (a total of twelve behaviors was listed, please see appendix O for the complete list). 





Manipulation Check. Again, one-way ANOVA showed that the intention manipulation 
was successful, such that those in the malevolent intention condition (M  = 4.76, SD = 1.87) felt 
that their intention was more malevolent than those in the benevolent intention condition while 
completing the social media campaign (M  = 1.71, SD = 1.18; F (1, 78) = 74.14, p < .001).  
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Creativity. Six independent judges provided originality ratings (original, novel, and 
innovative) for the generated ideas (range: α = .93 to 1.0). These ratings were then used to 
calculate an overall originality score for each participant (α = .86). One-way ANOVA revealed 
that having a malevolent intention (M  = 3.65, SD = .99) enhanced the originality of the generated 
ideas as compared to those having a benevolent intention (M  = 3.19, SD = 1.05; F (1, 78) = 4.14, 
p = .045). Another one-way ANOVA conducted for an overall effectiveness score (useful, 
effective and practical; α = .65), calculated using the ratings from another set of three 
independent judges (range: α = .93 to 1.0), returned a non-significant effect of intention on the 
effectiveness of the ideas (Mmalevolent = 4.48, SD = .80; Mbenevolent = 4.23, SD = .95; F (1, 78) = 
1.56, p = .22).  
 
Grandiose Sense of Self. Next, I averaged participants’ responses to the twelve items 
measuring grandiose sense of sense (α = .89). One-way ANOVA conducted for this index 
revealed that having malevolent intentions (M = 4.56, SD = 1.09) versus benevolent intentions 
(M = 4.03, SD = 1.06) did indeed induce a grandiose sense of self (F(1, 78) = 4.69, p = .033).  
 
Mediation Analysis. Finally, I conducted a mediation analysis to examine whether, as 
hypothesized, grandiose sense of self drives the effect of malevolent intention on creativity. 
Note, because it was found that malevolent intentions significantly impacted only the originality 
of the ideas, the mediation analysis was conducted only for this dimension of creativity. To do so 
I adopted a bootstrap approach and included intention as the independent variable, grandiose 
sense of self as the mediator, and originality as the dependent variable in the model (Preacher, 
Rucker, and Hayes 2007). A bias corrected bootstrap confidence interval obtained by resampling 
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the data 10,000 times did not include zero, thereby indicating a significant indirect (i.e., 
mediation) effect of grandiose sense of self on the relationship between malevolent intention and 




As hypothesized, it was found that malevolent intention enhanced the originality of the 
generated ideas, replicating the previous results. More importantly, this experiment provides 
support for the proposed underlying mechanism by demonstrating that engaging in a creative 















2.10 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Through one pilot study and four experiments, this research shows that having a 
malevolent intention while engaging in a creative task increases the originality of the outcome 
produced. This is because malevolent intentions induce perceptions of a grandiose sense of self 
(i.e., an aggrandized feeling of self-importance with agentic self-beliefs), which motivates people 
to stand out and be different from others in order to maintain such self-image, which in turn 
increases originality. Importantly, I rule out alternative explanations of the observed effect, such 
as intrinsic motivation, involvement, and effort. In this paper, I also demonstrate an interesting 
boundary condition that when malevolent intention has an unintentional benevolent consequence 
that may benefit other people, the positive effect of malevolent intention on creativity is 
attenuated.  
The current research proposes to make several important theoretical and practical 
contributions. First, while prior research has studied benevolent creativity (i.e., creativity that has 
positive purposes), researchers have only very recently started to explore the concept of 
malevolent creativity (creativity that has negative purposes; Cropley et al. 2014). This research 
contributes to both lines of literature by directly comparing benevolent and malevolent creativity 
and showing that people may be able to come up with even more creative ideas when creativity 
is used for negative purposes than for positive purposes. Thus, this research brings about the dark 
side of creativity and shows that those having a malevolent intention to hurt others may generate 
more creative ideas than those intending to help others. Hence, it can be argued that while 
creativity can be beneficial in many different ways and is one of the most important forces for 
societal advancement, creativity can also be a potent destructive force. 
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Second, an important contribution of this paper is that it advances the creativity literature 
that examines the relationship between motivation and creativity. While previous research has 
explored how various aspects of motivation, such as strength of motivation or source of 
motivation, influence creativity, to my knowledge no previous research has examined how one’s 
motivation valence while engaging in creative tasks may impact their creative output. This 
research shows that having a negatively (vs. positively) valenced motivation can, in fact, lead to 
higher creativity.  While prior literature in general has shown that positive valence increases 
creativity (Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki 1987; Estrada, Isen, and Young 1994), this work 
provides novel insights into the conditions under which negative valence may enhance creativity.  
This research also opens up avenues for future research. One interesting question that 
arises is whether different types of malevolent intention may differentially affect one’s ability to 
generate original ideas. For example, Baumeister and Campbell (1999) argue that people can 
have malevolent intentions because of three sources: 1) deriving pleasure from the suffering of 
the victim, 2) the quest for thrilling sensations, and 3) protecting one’s threatened egotism. One 
may argue that the three sources can be categorized into either intrinsically motivated 
malevolence (i.e., getting pleasure and thrilling sensations from being malevolent) or 
extrinsically motivated (i.e., protecting the ego or taking action out of revenge). However, in 
both cases, a grandiose sense of self should be induced, whether one is extrinsically or 
intrinsically motivated. While in most of the studies I have conducted, malevolent intention was 
derived from extrinsic sources (e.g., taking action out of revenge), there is no reason to believe 
that intrinsically motivated malevolence will operate differently. In fact, I speculate that the 
grandiose sense of self will be even higher when a person has intrinsically motivated malevolent 
intention, as they may have a more inflated sense of self-importance when they are able to hurt 
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others for their own gain and pleasure. Hence, I expect that both types of malevolence will lead 
to a higher grandiose sense of self, and hence, higher originality. However, more empirical 
evidence is needed, and future research could dive deeper into this interesting question.  
Another interesting research question is whether having a malevolent intention is 
associated with risk seeking. As mentioned earlier, when one has a malevolent intention to hurt 
others, it induces a grandiose sense of self, in which a person has an inflated sense of self-
importance and superior agentic beliefs. Such an inflated sense of self-importance may preclude 
the realistic appraisal of one’s likelihood of success needed for successful decisions, resulting in 
overconfidence and risk-taking (Campbell, Goodie, and Foster 2004). This is because such 
people are focused on success and achievement (i.e., protecting their inflated self-view), while 
not worrying about failure, even when it means they may be making more inferior and poorer 
decisions and judgments (Elliot and Thrash 2001). In addition, one may argue that malevolence 
may be aimed at facilitating short-term, exploitative social tactics (Crysel, Crosier, and Webster 
2013) in which a person is focused on short-terms gains – either at the expense of others or to 
pursue one’s own ends. Hence, such people have a short-term view and are more impulsive and 
disinhibited, and thus, willing to take risks. Further, once an individual is more willing to take 
risks and employ an explorative strategy, s/he will be able to come up with more original ideas 
(Mehta and Zhu 2009; Friedman and Forster 2002, 2005). Thus, it is possible risk-seeking is one 
of the related constructs that drives this positive effect on originality, and future research should 
investigate the role of risk seeking in this relationship.  
Interestingly, one may argue that since having a malevolent intention in itself violates 
social norms, the solutions provided by the creators should be outside of norm boundaries as 
well, which should be judged as more original. While this may seem to be likely, social norms 
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may not always be associated only with benevolence. In fact, in some cases, having the 
malevolent intention to hurt others will be the social norm. For example, it would be considered 
a normative behavior to hurt and punish someone who has broken the law or violated injunctive 
norms (Christensen et al. 2004). Hence, it would be of interest for future research to examine the 
conditions under which malevolent intention implies normative or non-normative behaviors, 
which in turn influence the originality of ideas. The current research speculates that the effect 
should hold for both conditions, irrespective of whether it is of a normative or non-normative 
behaviors, because in both cases, a grandiose sense of self is likely to be induced, which in turn 
leads to higher originality. However, more empirical evidence is needed to support this 
speculation.  
One other interesting domain is to examine whether judges rate negatively valenced ideas 
as more creative than positively valenced ideas. One may argue that negatively valenced 
information is more unusual, and hence judges may rate them as more creative than positively 
valenced information. The output associated with a malevolent intention in general can be seen 
as negative in nature, and thus one could argue that the observed effect is a judge’s rating 
artifact. While further in-depth work is needed to understand this effect, I conjecture that this 
might not be the case. Note, in Experiment 3, the effect was attenuated when the malevolent 
intention had an unintentional benefit for other people (i.e., spreading negative word of mouth to 
hurt a company in order to help other consumers make informed decisions). While the output for 
both conditions (control and unintentional benefit condition) was negative in nature, I did not 
observe a positive effect in the unintentional benefit condition. However, it would be interesting 
to examine how people judge the creativity of positively valenced ideas versus negatively 
valenced ideas. On the one hand, one may intuitively think negatively valenced ideas are more 
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unusual and may thus be seen as more original. On the other hand, one may argue that negatively 
valenced ideas are outside of our comfort zone, and judges may punish those ideas and rate them 
as less creative. In fact, some prior research provides support for this notion and has found that 
when encountering things that violate people’s cognitive schema, no matter how open-minded 
they are, people are less able to recognize those as creative ideas (Mueller, Melwani, and 
Goncalo 2010).  
To conclude, this research shows that having malevolent intentions while engaging in 
creative tasks ironically helps people generate more original ideas. This may help explain why 
we observe many out-of-the-box ideas when people are trying to hurt others and in fact set off an 
alarm that creativity can be dangerous and destructive for human society. Thus, for consumer 
researchers, it is not only important to understand the bright side of creativity, but also to 
understand its dark side. Undoubtedly, creativity is important and beneficial for both consumers 
and companies. Consumers employ their creativity to solve everyday problems or to customize 
products to signal their own identities. For companies, creativity and originality are among the 
most important sources of business success (Mehta et al. 2012). However, malevolent creativity 
(i.e., creativity that is used to hurt others) is also prevalent in the market place. For example, 
consumers can use creative ways to sabotage a brand or use social media creatively to cyberbully 
others. This phenomenon is especially relevant with the currently rapidly changing society – e.g., 
the fast-growing usage of social media and liberated consumers who are not passive shoppers 
anymore. Hence, it is important to understand more about malevolent creativity within the 
consumer domain. In fact, this is one of the first researches within the consumer domain that 
examines the concept of malevolent creativity, and hence sets a platform for future research to 
further investigate this interesting and important topic. I hope my work spurs more interest in 
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examining the concept of malevolent creativity and further develops an understanding of this 
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Figure 7: Donation box for Healthier Tomorrow 









APPENDIX B: Elephant Drawings in Experiment 1 (Essay 1) 
 











































APPENDIX C: Experiment 1 (Essay 1) Pretest Procedure and Results 
 
 
The pretest was conducted to test the elephant coloring stimuli for manipulation 
effectiveness. In particular, I wanted to assess that as desired engaging in the creative versus 
non-creative version of the task will indeed influence creativity. Also, I wanted to test if the two 
versions of the task will have any effect on other potential confounding variables – level of 
involvement, perception of self-competence, feeling of satisfaction, and mood.  
 
Method 
Twenty-three undergraduate students at a large North American university completed this 
pretest study in exchange for a course credit. The study adopted a one-way between subjects 
design, where participants were assigned to either creative or non-creative coloring condition. 
The conditions were randomized by session. All participants were given a sheet of paper with a 
picture of an elephant (please see appendix B) and were asked to color it. Those in the creative 
condition were provided with a box of crayon markers with ten different colors and were told to 
be as creative as possible while coloring and decorating the elephant picture. They were also told 
that they could use any and as many different colors as they would like for the task. Those in the 
control condition were provided with ten grey crayon markers and were told to simply color the 
elephant picture. In both the conditions, participants were asked to not spend more than five 
minutes on the coloring task. After completing the manipulation task, participants answered 
relevant follow-up questions. 
 Specifically, to measure task creativity, participants were asked to indicate how creative 
they felt the elephant drawing task was, and how much creativity they felt it required to 
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successfully complete the elephant drawing task. Next, they responded to three questions that 
measured their level of involvement on 7- point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much, α = .72) – 
1) how much effort did you put into the elephant coloring task, 2) how motivated were you to do 
well on the elephant coloring task, and 3) how involved would you say you were when 
completing the elephant coloring task. To measure perception of self-competence and 
satisfaction with their performance, participants indicated how competent they felt while they 
were completing the elephant drawing task, and how satisfied they were with the elephant that 
they drew. Finally, to assess participants’ mood, I asked them to indicate how they had felt while 
completing the elephant coloring task using 7-point scales (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) on six 
items. Three of these items concerned positive mood (happy, cheerful, excited; α = .89) and three 
concerned negative mood (sad, depressed, upset; α = .97). 
 
Results 
As intended, it was found that participants in creative versus non-creative coloring 
condition felt that the task they completed was significantly more creative in nature (Mcreative = 
4.20, SD = 1.03; Mnon-creative = 2.08, SD = .95; F(1, 21) = 26.07, p < .001) and required more 
creativity to complete ( Mcreative = 3.50, SD = 1.72; Mnon-creative = 2.15, SD = 1.46; F(1, 21) = 
4.12, p = .055). However, one-way ANOVA showed no difference between the two conditions 
on the other confounding variables. There was no observed difference on participants’ level of 
involvement between the two conditions (Mcreative = 3.97, SD = 1.16, Mnon-creative = 3.77, SD = 
1.24; F < 1). Further, I found no differences on perceived self-competence (Mcreative = 4.30, SD = 
2.06, Mnon-creative = 4.46, SD = 1.90; F < 1) and felt satisfaction (Mcreative = 4.30, SD = 1.70, Mnon-
creative = 3.85, SD = 1.41; F < 1). In addition, no difference was observed on either the positive 
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mood (Mcreative = 4.10, SD = 1.25, Mnon-creative = 4.05, SD = 1.37; F < 1) or negative mood (Mcreative 
















































BTW, before you begin the next part of the study, we have a request to make. The experimenters 
are helping a non-profit organization 'Elephant Parade' by raising money for it.   
Elephant Parade is a non-profit organization that provides a structural and ongoing source of 
income for elephant welfare and conservation, making it possible to give elephants a fighting 
chance in the battle for space, dignity and survival. The organization is committed to raising 
funds to make a difference and to help save elephants.   
If you would like to help out, you may donate any amount that you would like, from the money 
you received for participating in this study. You can simply put the quarters that you are willing 



































APPENDIX E: Donation Appeal for ‘Healthier Tomorrow’ in Experiments 2, 4 and 
Follow-up Studies (Essay 1) 
 
 
A Healthier Tomorrow is a national non-profit organization that seeks to empower individuals to 
develop the skills to overcome the epidemic of obesity and sedentary lifestyles focusing on 
changes in communities around the country to improve nutrition and increase physical activity. 
This national organization fosters sound nutrition and good physical activity in schools and 
communities, envisioning a country where everyone develops the lifelong habits necessary to 






































APPENDIX F: Definitions for Four Levels of Moral Boundaries in Experiment 2 (Essay 1) 
 
 
Inner circle of moral concern: these entities deserve the highest level of moral concern and 
standing. You have a moral obligation to ensure their welfare and feel a sense of personal 
responsibility for their treatment. 
  
Outer circle of moral concern: these entities deserve moderate moral concern and standing. 
You are concerned about their moral treatment; however, your sense of obligation and personal 
responsibility is greatly reduced. 
  
Fringes of moral concern: these entities deserve minimal moral concern and standing, but you 
are not morally obligated or personally responsible for their moral treatment. 
  
Outside of moral boundary: these entities deserve no moral concern or standing. Feeling 




































Founded in 1970, Pediatric Cancer Foundation is a non-profit charity. It raises money to provide 
medical care, food, and shelter to young cancer patients around the world who are in poverty.  
Our mission is simple: to provide help and love to kids who are in need and let them know that 
they are not being left alone.  







































APPENDIX H: Analogies Used in Experiment 4 (Essay 1) 
 
 
1. Baker : Cake :: Scientist : Discovery 
2. Answer : Riddle :: Key : Lock 
3. Father : Son :: Inventor : Invention 
4. Foundation : House :: Premise : Argument 
5. Knee : Kneepad :: Snail : Shell 
6. Lawschool : Lawyer :: Vineyard : Wine 
7. Movie : Screen :: Lightning : Sky 
8. Rectangle : Perimeter :: Nation : Border 
9. Saxophone : Jazz :: Typewriter : Poetry 








































Imagine that you are a college student who is active on social media. For no particular reason, 
you really dislike one of your classmates, Nancy. You don't get along with her and you want to 
agonize her.  
 
Therefore, you decide to use social media to cyber bully Nancy. Now, considering you have 




Imagine that you are a college student who is active on social media. For no particular reason, 
you really like one of your classmates, Nancy. You get along well with her and you want to help 
her. She is being cyberbullied. 
 
Therefore, you decide to use social media to help  Nancy. Now, considering you have benevolent 




Imagine that you are a college student who is active on social media. You found out that you 
have been cyber bullied by your classmate recently.  
 


























Imagine that you are a creative director at an ad agency and are looking to do an out of the box 
social media project to reaffirm your position as one of the best creatives in the field. One of 
your friends tells you about her recent experience with a so-called innovative all natural Salmon 
enzyme based skincare line that had worked really bad for her. After just a few uses her skin 
started to look puffed and dull. 
  
You do a bit more research and are truly disappointed with this new expensive and so-called 
innovative skincare line and decide to create a negative word of mouth campaign that may in fact 
hurt this company. 
  
Your task is to come up with an idea for a creative social media campaign to generate a negative 
word of mouth for this company, which will help you show off your skills as one of the best 




Imagine that you are a creative director at an ad agency and are looking to do an out of the box 
social media project to reaffirm your position as one of the best creatives in the field. One of 
your friends tells you about her recent experience with an innovative all natural Salmon enzyme 
based skincare line that had worked really well for her. After just a few uses her skin looked a lot 
healthier and radiant. 
  
You do a bit more research and are truly impressed with this new innovative skincare line and 
decide to create a positive word of mouth campaign that may help this company. 
  
Your task is to come up with an idea for a creative social media campaign to generate a positive 
word of mouth for this company, which will also help you show off your skills as one of the best 




















1. I think I would enjoy developing this word of mouth campaign very much.  
2. I see that this activity will be a lot of fun to do. 
3. I see that this activity will be a boring activity to do.  
4. I think that this activity will not hold my attention at all.  
5. I think that I will describe this activity of developing this word of mouth campaign as very 
interesting.  
6. I think developing this word of mouth campaign will be quite enjoyable.  




8. I think I will put a lot of effort into this. 
9. I will not try very hard to do well at this activity.  
10. I think that I will try very hard on this activity. 
11. I would say that it is important to me to do well at this task. 
12. I think that I will not put much energy into this.  
 
Perceived competence:  
 
13. I think I will be pretty good at this activity. 
14. I think I will do pretty well at this activity‚ compared to other people in the field. 
15. I believe that after working at this activity for a while‚ I will feel pretty competent. 
16. I think I will be satisfied with my performance at this task. 
17. I think I am pretty skilled at this activity. 


















APPENDIX L: Experiment 2 (Essay 2) Scenarios 
 
 
Malevolent_Company Condition:  
 
Imagine that you were visiting a big city in the United States for the first time. You decided to 
use taxi as the main transportation while visiting this city from a renowned taxi company that 
provides service nationwide. You chose this company because of their professionalism, good 
customer service and reasonable price. One of your taxi drivers is named Adam. You realize that 
the service he provides was minimal at best. He was very rude, and the rides were not 
comfortable at all. You even felt having sick stomach after getting off from the taxi. You did not 
enjoy chatting with him because he brought up topics that were not appropriate and you had bad 
experience while taking the taxi to travel from one place to the other.  
 
You have really bad experience with Adam and you decide to use a creative way to take a 
revenge from the taxi company that Adam was working for. You feel that using social media will 
be the most effective way to revenge and hurt the company. Now please come up with a creative 




Imagine that you were visiting a big city in the United States for the first time. You decided to 
use taxi as the main transportation while visiting this city from a renowned taxi company that 
provides service nationwide. You choose this company because of their professionalism, good 
customer service and reasonable price. One of your taxi drivers is named Adam. You realize that 
the service Adam provides stands above and beyond your expectations. He was very friendly, 
and made sure you had comfortable rides. He even went above and beyond and recommended 
good places for you to go and the favorite restaurants of the locals. You enjoyed chatting with 
him and always had good experience while taking the taxi to travel from one place to the other.  
  
You really appreciate everything that Adam has done for you, and you decide to use a creative 
way to thank the taxi company that Adam was working for. You feel that using social media will 
be the most effective way to support and help the company. Now please come up with a creative 




Imagine that you were visiting a big city in the United States for the first time. You decided to 
use Uber as the main transportation while visiting this city. You chose Uber because of its 
professionalism, good customer service and reasonable price. One of your Uber drivers is named 
Adam. You realize that the service Adam provides was minimal at best. He was very rude, and 
the rides were not comfortable at all. You even felt having sick stomach after getting off from his 
car. You did not enjoy chatting with him because he brought up topics that were not 




You have really bad experience with Adam and you decide to use a creative way to take a 
revenge from him. You feel that using social media will be the most effective way to revenge 
and hurt the him. Now please come up with a creative social media campaign in order to hurt 
Adam. Please be as creative as possible.  
 
Benevolent_individual Condition:  
 
Imagine that you were visiting a big city in the United States for the first time. You decided to 
use Uber as the main transportation while visiting this city. You chose Uber because of its 
professionalism, good customer service and reasonable price. One of your Uber drivers is named 
Adam. You realize that the service Adam provides stands above and beyond your expectations. 
He was very friendly, and made sure you had comfortable rides. He even went above and beyond 
and recommended good places for you to go and the favorite restaurants of the locals. You 
enjoyed chatting with him and always had good experience with him while traveling from one 
place to the other.  
  
You really appreciate everything that Adam has done for you, and you decide to use a creative 
way to thank him. You feel that using social media will be the most effective way to support and 
help him. Now please come up with a creative social media campaign in order to support Adam. 

































Imagine that you had been planning to take a family vacation this upcoming summer. You want 
this vacation to be a memorable experience for you and your family. Therefore you decided to 
work with A&J Vacations – a vacation planning company. You choose this company because of 
their professionalism, good customer service and reasonable price. Once you make your 
bookings, you realize that the company stands above and beyond your expectations. The staffs 
are very welcoming and they work as a team to make sure that you have a great experience. 
Also, there are no hidden fees or service charges. You had a really amazing experience dealing 
with the company. 
 
You really appreciate everything that the company has done for you, and you decide to use a 
creative way to thank the company. You feel that using social media will be the most effective 
way to support and help the company. Now please come up with a creative social media 




Imagine that you had been planning to take a family vacation this upcoming summer. You want 
this vacation to be a memorable experience for you and your family. Therefore you decided to 
work with A&J Vacations – a vacation planning company. You choose this company because of 
their professionalism, good customer service and reasonable price. However, once you make 
your bookings, it seems like the company has turned against you. The customer support is almost 
non-existent and the staffs are rude at the best. Also you come to realize that there are a lot of 
hidden fees and service charges, which was completely unexpected. 
 
You have been arguing with the company for a while now but to no avail and you decide to use a 
creative way to take a revenge from the company. You feel that using social media will be the 
most effective way to revenge and hurt the company. Now please come up with a creative social 
media campaign in order to hurt the company. Please be as creative as possible.  
  
Benevolent_ Unintended Benevolent Consequence Condition: 
 
Imagine that you had been planning to take a family vacation this up coming summer. You want 
this vacation to be a memorable experience for you and your family had therefore decided to 
work with A&J Vacations – a vacation planning company. You choose this company because of 
their professionalism, good customer service and reasonable price. Once you make your 
bookings, you realize that the company stands above and beyond your expectations. The staff is 
very welcoming and the work as a team to make sure that you have a great experience. Also, 




You really appreciate everything that the company has done for you, and you decide to use a 
creative way to thank the company. You feel that using social media will be the most effective 
way to support and help the company because consumers around the globe can see your good 
experience. Now please come up with a creative social media campaign to make people aware of 
your good experience in order to support the company. Please be as creative as possible.  
 
Malevolent_Unintended Benevolent Consequence Condition: 
 
Imagine that you had been planning to take a family vacation this up coming summer. You want 
this vacation to be a memorable experience for you and your family had therefore decided to 
work with A&J Vacations – a vacation planning company. You choose this company because of 
their professionalism, good customer service and reasonable price. However, once you make 
your bookings, it seems like the company has turned against you. The customer support is almost 
non-existent and the staff is rude at the best. Also you come to realize that there are a lot of 
hidden fees and service charges, which was completely unexpected. 
 
 
You have been arguing with the company for a while now but to no avail and you decide to use a 
creative way to take a revenge from the company. You feel that using social media will be the 
most effective way to revenge because consumers around the globe can see your bad experience. 
Now please come up with a creative social media campaign to make people aware of your bad 































Imagine that you are a creative director at an ad agency and are looking to do an out of the box 
social media project to reaffirm your position as one of the best creatives in the field. One of 
your friends tells you about her recent experience of flying with the AJX airline. She said that 
she had the worst flight experience ever with this airline company. The airline crew was very 
rude, and the check-in and boarding processes were really unsmooth and slow. She had very 
little legroom, and the flight was bumpy the whole time. The staff also handled her suitcase very 
rudely and they even broke her suitcase and did not apologize for their mistake. 
  
You do a bit more research and are really disappointed with this airline and the business 
philosophy of this airline, and decide to create a negative word of mouth campaign that may hurt 
this company. 
  
Your task is to come up with an idea for a creative social media campaign to generate a negative 
word of mouth for this company, which will also help you show off your skills as one of the best 




Imagine that you are a creative director at an ad agency and are looking to do an out of the box 
social media project to reaffirm your position as one of the best creatives in the field. One of 
your friends tells you about her recent experience of flying with the AJX airline. She said that 
she had the best flight experience ever with this airline company. The airline crew was very 
friendly, and the check-in and boarding processes were really easy and quick. She had a lot of 
legroom even when sitting in an economy class, and the flight was very comfortable. The staff 
also handled her suitcase very carefully so it does not break. 
  
You do a bit more research and are truly impressed with this airline and the business philosophy 
of this airline, and decide to create a positive word of mouth campaign that may help this 
company. 
  
Your task is to come up with an idea for a creative social media campaign to generate a positive 
word of mouth for this company, which will also help you show off your skills as one of the best 










APPENDIX O: Grandiose Sense of Self Measure (Maslach et al. 1985; Essay 2) 
 
 
Now please think about your intention to generate the creative social media idea for the airline 
company, and then indicate how such intention makes you feel. Below are a few situations that 
you might encounter. We would like you to think about how much would you be willing to 
engage in the behaviors below at this moment in time.  
 
At this moment, I would be willing to … 
 
1. Give a lecture to a large audience. 
2. Raise my hand to ask a question in a meeting or lecture. 
3. Volunteer to head a committee for a group of people I do not know very well.  
4. Tell a person that I like him/her. 
5. Publicly challenge a speaker whose position clashes with my own. 
6. Accept a nomination to be a leader or a group. 
7. Present a personal opinion, on a controversial issue, to a group of strangers. 
8. When asked to introduce myself, I would say something more personal about myself than 
just my name and occupation. 
9. Give an informal talk in front of a small group of classmates or colleagues. 
10. Speak up about my ideas even though I am uncertain of whether I am correct.  
11. Perform on a stage before a large audience. 
12. Give my opinion on a controversial issue, even though no one has asked for it.  
 
 
